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ABSTRACT
This thesis presupposes that America is in a time of
increasing danger as its relative power in the world declines.
The paper, in addressing this situation, defines strategy as
a method of thought. It distinguishes between the more con-
ceptual strategy and the product of planning, doctrine. Such
a distinction allows the formulation of a general concept of
strategy which remains constant and continuous over time.
This in turn provides the solid foundation necessary for flexi-
ble and timely planning in a time of unprecedented change.
The paper contains four recommendations: 1.) To increase
the historical and philosophical training of military officers,
and to emphasize the study of the art of war; 2.) To train and
assign a dedicated group of strategic planners who rotate
between field and staff, but whose principle job is planning;
3.) To centralize the chain of command in the Department of
Defense; and 4.) To decentralize authority in the Department
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"IfJhzn onz hat, sie.cLch.zd an undzsii>tandtnq o &
what ma.tzn.la.l6 asiz fcusintAhzd by thz would
astound about htm, and what tiz&ouKczb hz can
hopz ^osi tn&tdz htmAzZfa, tt bttZZ n.zmatn&
£osi htm to appiattz thz patt ai> tt 16 tz{$t
to opzsiatz tn thz psizAznt, to undzsittand tt,
to appstop-ltatz tt, and to bzcomz tti> maitzsi."
John Hzlman RandaZZ, Jsi. , 1940

I. INTRODUCTION
"There li> no organization in the United
State* who£& miction iA to pK2.pa.t12 a
strategic analytic . Thi<!> ii> a AeriouA
d2.i2.ct In our national security policy
machinery, but it ii> not likely to be
ob6e<tved by th2 average civilian o^icial
because strategic appreciation ha6 nearly
become a lo6t ait; and one doeb not heel the
need ^or something he ha* never teen on. known
about.
"
Stefan T. Po66ony £ 3.E. Pournelle
This paper defines strategy as a method thought that pro-
poses a framework for the realistic evaluation of national
security needs and consequently, for the development of stra-
tegic doctrine. It does not offer a specific strategy for
the United States, nor does it prescribe an organization de-
signed to develop a specific strategy. Instead, it provides
the conceptual foundation that is essential to such tasks. It
develops the perspective from which reform must be viewed. ^
As will be seen, the key element within which strategy
must operate is chance, which yields an uncertainty that cannot
The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War
(Cambridge, Mass.: Dunellen, 1970), p. 64.
The principal theoretical background for this framework
is largely derived from Carl von Clausewitz, On War , ed. and
trans, by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976); General d'Armee Andre Beaufre , An
Introduction to Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1965); and Beaufre , Deterrence and Strategy (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger" 1966)
.

be predicted or eliminated. Hence, in an anarchic and hostile
world, where each nation must look after itself, flexibility
and timeliness are essential for survival; flexibility in
adapting to rapidly changing circumstances, and timeliness in
doing so quickly and correctly. Too often in the past, doc-
trinal rigidity or dogma has destroyed this flexibility. The
result, except in the most extraordinary of circumstances, has
been disaster.
Examples of this abound. For instance, in 1494, Charles
VIII of France invaded an Italy unprepared for his new style
of warfare, and destroyed its political system. Italy's
castles, suitable defense against the slow paced inter-city-
state warfare of the penninsula, were no match against the
French artillery. And, Italian mounted troops were no match
for the Swiss infantry employed by Charles.
The cause of this unpreparedness has disturbing parallels
with American society today. Italy in the 15th Century was
a commercial empire that relied primarily on the disorganiza-
tion of its neighbors for security. Wars were expensive, and
hence not fought. The unpreparedness for invasion stemmed
from a lack of concern for the art of war which was " ... the
result of a preoccupation with personal well-being, inextricably
"Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli : The Renaissance of the Art
of War," in Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1943 J , pp. 8-9.

connected with a society dominated by finance and commercial
4interest." The result of the French invasion was that
"To their dismay, the Italians were forced to become
mere onlookers as their country became the battle-
field of Europe and the center of attraction for all
foreigners in search of military renown.... Those who
speculated about the fate of Italy arrived necessarily
at the conclusion that the Italians had to reform
their military institutions if they wanted to equal




Other examples of this failure to adapt include the Prussian
defeat at Jena in 1806. There the army--and tactics--of
Frederick the Great could not withstand Napoleon and his
revolutionary army. The French and their Maginot Line in
1940 follow this pattern, as does the American reluctance to
accept the aircraft carrier for the weapon it was until after
the Pearl Harbor attack on 7 December, 1941. '
Ibid.





See Brig. Gen. Vincent J. Esposito, USA (Ret.), and Col.
John R. Elting, USA, A Military History and Atlas of the
Napoleonic Wars (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964),
plates 57- 68 .
-7
'For an excellent discussion of the Maginot Line and the
mentality it generated, see Irving M. Gibson, "Maginot and
Liddell Hart: The Doctrine of Defense," in Makers of Modern
Strategy
,
ed . E.M. Earle, pp. 371-375. On America's obsession
with the battleship see Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of
War (New York: Macmillan, 1975), Chap. 12. See G.H. Liddell
Hart, Strategy
,
2nd revised ed. (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1967) for a general discussion of military history
from the Greek wars (5th Century B.C.) to the Arab-Israeli
wars. Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense
Planning (Wash., D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982)
provides an analysis of the impact of doctrinal rigidity on
the effectiveness of strategic surprise.

Why, one must ask, is this the case? The answer is rather
simple: The failure to anticipate changes in warfare before
the opening of hostilities is primarily due to a failure in
the study of the art of war. What this means is that, while
professional military officers may study the techniques and
hardware of war, they tend not to look into its meaning, uses,
and socio-political contexts. In short, there is a tendency
to ignore the conceptual for the practical, to discard the
philosophic for the pragmatic. This tendency allows one to
master the techniques of the age, but, as has been argued, all
too often those techniques have been overtaken by events.
Despite the professionalization of the military since World
War II, this tendency prevails in the United States. The
"nuclear revolution" has been seen as revolutionizing warfare,
changing its fundamental nature, largely eliminating the impact
o
of its moral factors. In the late 1940s it was believed that
9
nuclear weapons had put an end to war. That this was not so
was demonstrated by the Korean War. Yet, it was not until
nearly ten years after that war that the United States aban-
doned its massive retaliation doctrine and began to consider
the reality of conventional and limited wars.
8 Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy,"
Foreign Affairs , Summer 1979, p. 982.
9 Liddell Hart, Strategy
,
p. 15.
This change was, among other factors, driven by the
writings of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, especially The




Vietnam taught America that even a superpower could be
defeated. Some would argue that North Vietnam won because of
political interference in military matters, others because of
the incompetency of the military. Colonel Harry Summers,
however, posits that the United States was defeated because
it lacked a strategy and because the military lacked the abil-
ity to communicate to the political leaders the danger toward
which they were heading. Furthermore, America ignored one
of the three essential elements of war defined by Carl von
12Clausewitz nearly 150 years before: the people. By not
declaring war, indeed, by failing to make any effort to elicit
the public's support for the war, the government, with the
military's implicit consent, sought in fact to fight an 18th
Century war; a war of, by, and for the government, instead of
the people.
A major reason public support was not sought was that it
was thought unnecessary, and was thought to be beyond the
American nature. How could America declare war on little
North Vietnam? Was there truely an zv<Ll out there to destroy?
Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA, On Strategy: A Critical




The three elements were the people, the army, and the
government. Carl von Clausewitz, On War . Specifically on the
need to gain the support of the people in war, see Col. Harry
Summers, Jr., USA, "Clausewitz and Strategy Today," U.S. Naval
War College, Mar. -Apr., 1983, pp. 40-46.
15 Summers, On Strategy , Ch. 1, especially pp. 12-16
11

The cause of this situation is that America has traditionally
not so much fought wars as it has embarked on crusades. 14
Concerned mainly with domestic affairs and westward expansion,
little thought has been given to foreign relations. War is
seen separate from day to day political intercourse:
"We have learned to make a nearly absolute distinction
between the states of war and peace as conditions in
human affairs, rather than recognizing them as poles
on the continuum of international relations which, , ,-
like flowers and seeds, contain each other's genes."
No less notable a general than Douglas MacArthur epitomized
this distinction in saying "... when all of the political
means failed, we then go to force." Thus, the tendency in
the United States has been to artificially separate peace from
war, as if war put an end to the political discourse of nations
The benefit of this lies in the fact that the American politi-
cian, largely oriented toward domestic issues, can divorce
himself from the realities of the world power struggle. He
can approach peace and international relations with the same
skills and perspective he would approach labor relations or
social reform. He need not concern himself with the messy
business of war, which is left to the generals and admirals.
i 4
Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American
Example," International Security
,
Fall 1981, p. 30.
15Chaplain (Col.) Charles F. Kriete, USA, "The Moral
Dimension of Strategy," Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army
War College , VII:2, 1977, p. 72.
32nd Congress, 1st Session, Military Situation in the
Far East
,




Likewise, the military in this case need not concern itself
with policy. Their job becomes merely managers of violence in
war, and of the bureaucracy in peace.
Under these conditions, the study of strategy falls between
the cracks, for the military's purpose is to implement the
strategy of the political superiors, while the politicians
concern themselves mainly with domestic issues. Strategy
therefore plays a minor role in the education of military
officers. Instead, their education serves to ensure a firm
grasp on the technical aspects of war- -tactics , command and
1 9
control, logistics and maintenance.
Thus, in America, the artificial separation of war and
peace, and the means of each, inhibits the growth of a holistic
perspective which encompasses both. This perspective is ab-
solutely essential if the nation is to ensure peace, and fail-
ing that, to prevail in war. The implication of this is that
the political leaders must learn more about the art of war,
and the soldiers more about the art of diplomacy. But more
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The
Theory and Politics of Civil -Mil itary Relations (Cambridge,




, pp. 2-3; and Gray, "National Style
in Strategy," p. 46.
19 See for example, Cdr. Thomas B. Buell, USN (Ret.), "The
Education of a Warrior," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Jan.
1981, pp. 41-45; and RAdm . James A. Winnefeld, USN (Ret.),
"The Quality of the Officer Corps," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, Sept. 1981, pp. 33-34.
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important, they must all learn more about strategy, for strat-
egy, in this era of nuclear deterrence, wars of national lib-
eration, and high technology must pertain equally to all phases
of the relations between nations, and must efficiently organize
the entire resources of a nation for its long term security.
Strategy must therefore address all levels of the government,
and must seek to optimize the application of the nation's
resources in pursuit of the aims of policy which in turn
respond to the nature of the international environment. For
this kind of planning, the United States government is
ill-prepared. Congress is ruled by committees, each jealously
guarding its own power, with no single one in a position to
consider the overall impact and coordination of the policies
decided upon. 4' The Executive branch, from which should
originate long range planning proposals for consideration by
Congress, is almost myopically concerned with the annual budget
21and with crisis management." Very little long range planning
is done, and what is is too vague and "watered down" to be
20
Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and Its
Members (Wash., D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), p.
227.
21 Philip S. Kronenberg, "Planning and Defense in the
Eighties," in Planning U.S. Security: Defense Policies in the
Eighties
,




On the government's long range planning ability, see John M.
Collins, U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press , 1982) , especially Part III; Possony and
Pournelle, Strategy of Technology
,
pp. 77-78; Lawrence J. Korb,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years
(Bloomington, Ind. : The Indiana University Press, 1976)
, pp
.




able to effectively direct operational or logistical planning. 22
For example, consider this passage:
"No American administration in recent memory has committed
substantial time, thought, or political muscle to the




Much the same can be said for the Executive branch's approach
to diplomacy, as Smith Simpson points out:
"Every company of any importance has a management action
planning system to enable it to operate by plan and
anticipation rather than by simply responding to
situations. The absence of such a system in the State
Department and in each office, such as Soviet Affairs,
and proper officer attitudes explain much of the
casual, relaxed, reactive way in which all too much
of our diplomacy is conducted." 24
What is true of the Executive as a whole, is also true of
the military. As suggested above, little worth is attached to
the study of military art and strategy. Technology is in vogue
today, and it is this that military officers study. Unfor-
tunately, as has been seen, there are very few within the
government who study the broad questions of the utility of
the forces the military buys. With each level of government
concerned about the technical aspects of administration, little
22 Collins, U.S. Defense Planning
,
p. 155.
2 5Hunter Lewis and Donald Allison, The Real World War:
The Coming Battle for the New Global Economy and Why We Are
Losing ! (New York: Coward, McCann $ Geoghegan, 1982 J , p~! I5~5
24 Smith Simpson, The Crisis in American Diplomacy: Shots
Across the Bow of the State Department (North Quincy, Mass.:
The Christopher Publishing House, 1980)
,
p . 29 6.
15

linkage exists between the goals set by high level policy
makers and military planners. In fact the main commonality
is the defense budget. It is the language all can understand,
and it is the language that military officers have been taught
25
to speak. u Dr. Edward Luttwak, a Senior Fellow at the George-
town Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes:
"In the officer corps there are plenty of engineers,
economists, and political scientists- -but where are
the tacticians? There are many skilled personnel
managers, logistical managers, and technical managers-
-
but where are the students of the operational level of
war? And at the top, there are many competent (and
politically sensitive bureaucrats - -but where are the
strategists?" 26
In addition to the general disregard of the art of war,
military assignment policies, both as a result of personnel
management decisions and legislated constraints, do not pre-
pare those planners who are employed for the job they must
27
do. Taken from the operating forces for short, one-time-
only tours, military planners are provided with little prepara-
tion short of on the job training. As Russell Murray, a former
Assistant Secretary of Defense, argues:
25 Edward N. Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare and
the Military Balance," Survival , Mar . -Apr . , 1979, p. 60.
26Edward N. Luttwak, "Towards Rearming America," Survival ,
Jan/Feb, 1981, p. 34.
^ 7Collins, U.S. Defense Planning, pp. 59-60.
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"The sad fact of the matter is that, while we would not
dream of letting an officer fly an F-15 without years
of highly specialized and immensely expensive training,
we are perfectly willing to let him, without a trace of
preparation, tackle matters demanding the most complex
professional military skills." 28
The American military, as well as the rest of the govern-
ment, is chained to the present. The day to day burdens of
administration are staggering enough without adding the need
for long range concept formulation. But, much of that day to
day administration is due precisely to the fact that no over-
all, long range guidance is available, hence decisions must
be pushed upstairs."
Concentration on operations, the budget and crisis manage-
ment, has forced America to stumble blindly through the past
forty years of its world leadership. Lacking the personnel
and the organization for long term concept formulation, the
nation has jumped from one crisis to the next, and from one
year to the next. Each event is seen only in relation to that
which has occurred most recently. In an era of technological
explosion, America has become enthralled with the means of
conflict, but has largely ignored the reasons and purposes of
that interaction between states. Our technological success
has deprived us the means by which that success can be
2 8
~ Russell Murray II, "Policies, Prices, and Presidents:
The Need to Enlighten the Great Choices in National Security,"
Armed Forces Journal International
,
June 1982, p. 59.
""Possony and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology, p. 72.
On this, see' also Col. William J. Taylor, USA (Ret.), "Leading
the Army," The Washington Quarterly , Winter 1985, pp. 42-45.
17

controlled: strategy. F. H. Hinsley underscores the irony of
this :
"That a civilisation which has broken through immense
barriers in almost every other direction, and which
has surpassed all its predecessors on innumerable
fronts, should still hold views and pursue programmes
in international politics that it held and pursued when
it was young--this is the outstanding failure of recent
times. Only one thing is more surprising: we do not
yet recognize this failure. "30
One reason such a failure is not recognized is the near
historical illiteracy of American society. History has never
held much fascination for Americans, except to confirm what
they had already suspected of their past:
"...a vindication of the principles of democracy and
liberty and order, _a demonstration of the triumph of
right over wrong. "31
But even this self-fulfilling concern for history disappeared
with the advent of nuclear weapons. Military history, once
the absolute minimum, the bare essential of a study of
strategy became irrelevant:
"Our own generation is unque , but sadly so, in produc-
ing a school of thinkers who are allegedly experts in
military strategy and who are certainly specialists in
military studies but who knoitf virtually nothing of
military history, including the history of our most
F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory
and Practice in the History of Relations Between States




Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpreta-
tion of American Thought and Character Since the 1880s (New
Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 273.
18

recent wars, and who 4eem not to aa/ie. about tkuln.
ig no nance.."* 2 (Emphasis added)
Historical perspective is essential in order to develop
strategy and have a degree of confidence in the planning
product. Luttwak provides an example of this in The. Gland
Stn.at2.gij o
^ the. Roman Empinz. How, he asks, were the Romans
able to secure their borders against barbarian invasions with
only twenty-nine legions? His answer: deterrence.
"Having learned in the earlier republican period how
to defeat neighbors in battle by sheer tactical
strength, having later mastered the strategic complex-
ities of large-scale warfare in fighting the Carthaginians,
the Romans finally learned that the most desirable use of
military power was not military at all, but political;
and indeed they conquered the entire Hellenistic world
with few battles and much coercive diplomacy
.
,OJ
Luttwak goes on to argue that it was the knowledge by
Rome's enemies that any offense against the Empire would
result in retaliation by the infamous legions that in fact
played a large part in maintaining Pax Romana . Indeed it was
only when the legions turned to civil war in the Third Century,
and thus removed their deterrent effect, that massive, and
34
nearly uncontrollable invasions developed.
Bernard Brodie, "The Continuing Relevance of On War ,
"
introductory essay to Clausewitz, On War
,
p. 55.
33Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman
Empire (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976),
p. 2. A legion then consisted of about 6000 men.
Ibid., p. 139. Another classic work that provides
interesting historical parallels is Barbara W. Tuchman, A





If strategy is not to be enslaved by the present then, it
must rely on the past. A study of the past reveals the full
range of characteristics that strategy can assume. It is this
full range that must be comprehended if the correct strategy
is to be chosen. Stxatzgy tku4 bzcomzi, not a single. ttiatzgy,
but a distillation o
fa
all past itn.at2.gtz6, and In this way
holm* a ^n.am<i\Mon.\i fan planning. It addresses the nature of
conflict and of the means available for its prevention or
resolution. In this context, strategy becomes a theory, or
even more, a philosophy by which to structure a specific
strategy for a specific set of circumstances. To clarify the
distinction between the two "strategies", the specific strat-
egies, which represent the latter condition, will be called
doctrine, and are the result of the planning process. There-
fore, strategy, in distilling the lessons of the multitude of
doctrines of the past, becomes a philosophy of those doctrines
Strategy, in short, is the philosophy of doctrine. Only in
this way is it cut loose from the bonds of the present and
given the flexibility required.
Strategy, therefore, is a method of thought, and is ap-
plicable to the entire spectrum of relations between states.
It promotes flexibility, efficiency, and realism in planning
for national security. The first step in further defining
this concept will be to describe the environment of strategy.
This environment derives it substance from the interaction
between nations. Strategy, in seeking to attain the ends
20

set out by policy, must operate in this environment, and hence
must conform to it. The environment of strategy then, is that
set of conditions that exist in international relations which
govern the success with which any plan is executed. If strat-
egy is planned without due consideration for its environment,
it will not reflect reality, and hence will in all probability
fail.
The second step will then be to define and elaborate on
strategy. Strategy on its own, just like war on its own,
makes no sense, * It must be firmly subordinated to the
dictates of policy. But, the key in subordinating means to
ends is, in the broad perspective, to tie strategy to the cere
values of a nation. This is especially true in the United
States. The nation is built upon ideals, not territory or
cultural homogeneity, therefore its strategy must defend
ideals as much as, if not more than, the tangible elements of
sovereignty."3 It is through policy that this is done.
The final step in the process of defining strategy as a
method of thought, is to discuss the planning function that
must accompany it. This discussion will not address organiza-
tion or procedure so much as perspective. The concern here




George Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United





to design an organization and procedures for the development
of doctrine. Therefore, the environment of planning is de-
fined, an environment that suggests the importance of the
opponent as an actively thinking participant in the inter-
national arena, and underscores the pervasiveness of chance.
Under these conditions, which derive their substance from the
interaction between strategy and the international system,
uncertainty is unavoidable, and hence flexibility essential.
Planning must therefore be able to adapt to sudden changes,
ones that cannot be predicted. It must be built upon a con-
cept of flexibility and timeliness, and must therefore have
the people and organizational structure necessary to provide
rapid and accurate responses.
In the final chapter of the thesis some recommendations
are offered that should bring such conditions about. The
recommendations deal primarily with the military, and, more
specifically, with the training of military officers. It is
felt that until the perspective from which the military
officer corps views its role in national security is changed,
changes in the organization will have only minimal effect.
The United States is desperately in need of doctrine based
on a firm understanding of the nature of strategy. In a
period of increasingly sophisticated and varied threats, of
skyrocketing costs for military equipment, and of America's
declining slzZcl£<Lvz power in the world, greater coordination,
planning, and efficiency are essential. Since the birth of
22

the nation, Americans have relied on the seas and on the future
to account for the errors of the present and to allow for a
virtually non-existent military defense capability. That
situation no longer obtains, and to continue to do business as
it was done in those days invites disaster.
In the next war, America will not have the luxury of sit-
ting behind its ramparts while it mobilizes and builds its
strength. All effort must therefore be directed to the pre-
vention of that war, and bv a multitude of means. Failing
this, the United States must have the leaders, planners, and
organization in hand that will allow it to fight and win that
war from day one. This paper goes far in defining a framework
for the development of such a system. It will link the core
values of the nation to the means at hand, and it will develop
a flexibility that will allow it to adapt to any threat.
Finally, it will foster long range planning which in turn will
allow the country to escape from the captivity of crisis
management and give it the chance to shape the future to its
own ends
.
This paper is an urgent recommendation to look realistically
at the world and our role in it; to realize that we must pass
from the innocence of childhood to the responsibility of
adulthood. And it is an urgent request to once again tie the




hardware and tactics of our forces, military and diplomatic,
to the core values of our nation, to re-discover our identity,
and to achieve our goals within the context of our ideals
.
In the Nineteenth Century we were able to do this because of
Pax Britannica. In this and the following century, we must
turn to our own devices. A failure to connect our values to
our means will in the end destroy those values. And without





THE ENVIRONMENT OF STRATEGY
"Nothing i6 mon.2. Important in li&z than Ending
the. flight
-Standpoint fao-l 6zzing and judging
2.v2.nt6 and thzn adhering to it. One. point and
one only yizld6 an integrated view o( all
pn2.nom2.na; and only by holding to that point
can one. avoid inc.0n6i6t2.ncy."
37
Casil von Clau.6 2.witz
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the fundamental
conditions under which strategy must operate; that is to say,
to describe its environment. The environment remains the
same over time and applies equally along the entire spectrum
of international relations. This is possible because the
conditions that constrain strategy rely only on the existence
of the nation state system for their substance. Thus, until
that system significantly changes its character, the environ-
ment of strategy will not change.
This environment is not to be considered a theory of
international relations, nor is it based on such a concept.
A sizable literature has developed since World War II which
attempts to fit the international system into various models




38behavior of nations. The environment of strategy, however,
rests on a more general plane than these theories, and posits
that, whatever the nature of the international system, as long
as it is composed of nation states, strategy will operate
against chance and violence (or passion)
.
38Among the better works that develop theories which as-
sume power to be the decisive element in international rela-
tions, are Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace
, 4th ed . (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1967); Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in Inter-
national Politics (New York: Wiley, 1956); Kenneth J. Holsti,




(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); and Kenneth N.
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley
, 19 79) . For theories of international rela-
tions that espouse the interdependence concept, see Robert 0.
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World
Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1977) ; and Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager , eds
.
, Economic
Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kansas: Allen Press,
1977) . A somewhat dated, Eut otherwise excellent overview of
the field is presented in Robert J. Lieber, Theory and World
Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1972). For the evolu-
tion of the international system see F. H. Hinsley, Power and
the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1963) ; and most recently, providing a combination of historian
and political scientist, Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L.
George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems in Our Time
(New York! Oxford University Press, 1983) . For a statement
on where the international system is headed, see Harold and
Margaret Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New
York: D. Van Nostrand, 1971) . Finally, the following three
works provide an excellent statement of the decisionmaking
process that accompanies international relations: Robert
Jervis, Perception and Mispercept ion in International Politics
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Glenn H. Snyder
and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977) ; and Alexander L. George, Presidential
Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of





Two principal benefits are gained from the unchanging
nature of these conditions. First, if the environment is
constant, then the experiences of past cultures may be an-
alyzed for possible lessons of relevance to today; the wheel
need not be re-invented. Second, it aids the security plan-
ning process by providing some sort of foundation upon which
to build strategy. Failure to understand this environment
and use it as the framework for one's plans, significantly
increases the likelihood that those plans will not account
for the uncertainties that may arise. In short, the plans
will not conform to reality, and thus, will not function in
it. Since this paper proposes a concept of strategy, the
first task must then be to comprehend this environment of
strategy.
In On WaA., Clausewitz provides the major source of this
concept of the environment. By extending his idea of the
fundamental nature of war to encompass the whole spectrum of
international relations, the environment of strategy may be
described as the. ^andamzntal znvi.sionme.nt o& tntzxna.ti.0 nat
tizla.tJ.on6. But, how can one justify such an extension when,
in his work, Clausewitz talks only of war? It is clear that
today this tool of policy is much more hazardous and expen-
sive than it was in his time. The existence of nuclear
weapons and the risk of escalation colors all deliberations
on whether or not to go to war. Under these conditions, can
such an approach be of value? To illustrate that it can, we
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must first briefly discuss exactly what he says, and then
see how his concepts apply.
The primary contribution Clausewitz has made to the study
of conflict is his discussion of the fundamental nature of
war. War, he argues, is unquestionably subordinated to the
political goals and mechanisms which cause it. In fact war,
far from being an autonomous activity, is merely one extreme
of the spectrum of international relations. The fundamental
nature of war is composed of three elements: passion, chance
and policy:
"The f irst .. .mainly concerns the people; the second the
commander and his army; the third the government. The
passions that are to be kindled in war must already be
inherent in the people; the scope which the play of
courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability
and chance depends en the particular character of the
commander and the army; but the political aims are the
business of government alone. "39
Of the three elements, only one, policy, involves the
rational planning, calculation, and contemplation that enter
into the conduct of war. The other two are in the main beyond
analysis and quantification. Indeed, it is chance and passion
that separate actual war from wargames and simulations. This
has been echoed by many of the great strategists of history.
Machiavelli felt that in considering war a science, chance and
passion are ignored, resulting in the erroneous belief that
"...war can be decided quite as well on paper as on the
39 Clausewitz, On War, 1:1:89
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battlefield." Clausewitz argues that friction, which is the
product of chance, "...is the only concept that more or less
corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war
41
on paper." Most recently, Col. Harry Summers has argued
that the "rationalistic economic approach" to war plays down
the intangible elements inherent in conflict between men. As
a result, we find ourselves materially well prepared for war,
4 2but less than ready to conduct it.
Because of passion and chance, nothing is certain in war,
even the simplest of plans is subject to failure at the hands
of uncertainty. Only the courage, resourcefullness , and
strength of character which reside in the commander and his
troops can ameliorate their impact. The development of these
two elements of war, combined with the third, policy, under-
score Clausewitz 's profound insight; a vision that enables
him to cut through the fog which surrounds an issue, and
uncover its core, its essential truth. In this case, the
truth is that war, by its nature, is non-rational, and
consequently, that the moral factors predominantly, but not
exclusively, outweigh the material ones. This conclusion is
echoed bv Beaufre:
40 Felix Gilbert, "Machiavell i : The Renaissance of the
Art of War," p. 25.






"More therefore than all plans and schemes based on
material factors, the art of battle consists in main-
taining and strengthening the psychological cohesion
Ox one's own troops while at the same time disrupting
that of the enemy's. The psychological facto*. Is
tkC'izhotiz all-impo/i£an£."43
With sufficient strength, of course, one can rely mainly
on the material factors of war. Such has been our practice
throughout much of our history. 44 This form of warfare fol-
lows an essentially logistical strategy and places emphasis
on firepower and technology. Its advantages lie mainly in
the reduction of uncertainty (mainly by ignoring it) and the
lack of a need for elaborate operational plans. Instead,
battlefield operations come to depend mainly on logistics.
It is in logistical planning, not operational, where the
complexity lies; and reliance on it overshadows other strate-
gic concepts. For example, the initial strategy of Opera-
tion Overlord, rather than envisioning a disruptive,
penetrating thrust into the Low Countries, was keyed to a
broad frontal advance to "...gain, at the earliest possible
46date, use of the enormously important ports of Belgium."
45Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy
,
p. 57.
44Edward Luttwak addresses the material superiority neces-
sary for this type of war, and American reliance on it through
out its history in "The American Style of Warfare," pp. 57-58.
Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War,"
International Security, Winter, 1980/81, p. 65.
46Dwight D. Eisenhower , Crusade in Europe (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 221T This reliance on logistical





As Luttwak writes of American efforts in Europe in 1944,
strategy:
"...was characterized by the broad-front advance of
units which engaged in tactical combat iztvLcLtlm.
Above the purely tactical level, the important
decisions were primarily of a logistic character."
The benefit of such a strategy is that a nation can rely on
relatively untrained citizen soldiers, reducing the need for
standing armies. Furthermore, with a large degree of cer-
tainty, victory becomes only a matter of time. Perhaps the
most attractive aspect of logistical war to Americans is the
savings in lives that it entails:
"We believe in using ' things *- -artillery , bombs,
massive firepower-
- in order to conserve our
soldiers' lives. "48
There are however, two major conditions to the successful
employment of this form of warfare. First, the enemy you
choose must be either materially inferior or near exhaustion
49
when you engage him. Second, one must be able to mobilize
rapidly, and in relative security, to build up the quantita-
tive edge needed. It can be argued that both of these
47
"The Operational Level of War," p. 62. Of the Americans,
German General Hermann Balck said: "Within my zone, the
Americans never onece exploited a success." Quoted in Battelle
Columbus Labs, "Translation of Taped Conversation with General
Hermann Balck, 13 April, 1979," (Columbus, Ohio, Jul. 1979).
p. 24.
48 General Fred C. Weyand, CDRS CALL, Jul . -Aug
.
, 1976, pp.
3-4. Cited in Harry Summers, On Strategy
,
p. 40.
49 Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 26.
o0Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," p. 7".
31

conditions are lacking today in our confrontation with the
Soviet Union.
By relying on logistical strategy only, the tendency is
to downplay the role of the opponent. He is seen as merely
a collection of hardware that must be destroyed. 51 In
reality, however, the opponent is an intelligent and actively
r o
thinking player, seeking always to thwart one's intentions.
If the role of chance and passion in war is acknowledged, if
it is realized that the moral factors far outweigh the
material, then it will become apparent that one's efforts
must be aimed at the enemy's will to fight, as well as his
ability to fight.
A further consideration that must be entered into when
dealing with a thinking opponent is that every action can
produce an unanticipated reaction on the part of the enemy,
which will in turn tend to disrupt one's plans. The solution
to this is either to be so materially superior that the fac-
tors of uncertainty are reduced to insignificance, or to have
the flexibility necessary to adapt.
To adopt the former course in this era of high technology
and against an opponent such as the Soviets is unwise and, in
likelihood, beyond our means. Therefore, only a strategy
Edward Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare," p. 57
52,
^Steven L. Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War,"
Clausewitz, On War , 1:1:77
'Ste
International Security Review, Fal 32, p.
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of flexibility remains a viable option. Because of the funda-
mental nature of war then, reliance on a logistical strategy
and rigid doctrines is extremely dangerous, and ill-advised.
An adjunct to this concept of the nature of war is the
idea that all plans must have combat as their distant focus:
"...it is inherent in the very concept of war that
everything that occurs ma&t originally dzn-ivo. ^nom
combat. "54
To qualify this concept, Clausewitz later adds that combat
actually need never take place, for it is not so much combat
that is of importance as is the ever-present threat of it.
This threat does not operate against the opponent's forces,
but instead it attacks his will to resist. It is the moral
factor that dominates, and that will later permit the applica-
tion of this concept to peacetime diplomacy. Thus, even
though the forces and plans we develop may not be used in
actual war, they must be designed with that in mind if they
are to be credible. And, credibility is the key to deterrence
Indeed, the idea of the threat is one of the fundamental
concepts of deterrence: if one is to know peace, then
prepare for war. In works on deterrence theory, there has
generally been an artificial separation between combat and
54 Clausewitz, On War
,
1:2:95.
H. Rothfels, "Clausewitz," in Makers of Modern Strategy ,
ed. E.M.Earle, p. 104.
56Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 541.
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57threat. Europe, for example, seeks deterrence but abhors
plans for successful warfighting
.
58
The United States has
followed much the same logic. Colin Gray writes that the aim
over the past two decades has not been toward
"...developing and deploying weapons so as to ensure
American freedom of action in crisis and war, thus
assuring, insofar as possible, a meaningful pre- and
intra-war deterrence. Instead it was developing and
deploying weapons above all else for their negotiability,
or utility as bargaining tools, for the better manage-
ment of a (U.S. -style) stable strategic balance." 59
From the relation between combat and threat discussed above,
it can be seen that such a separation is false.
War deals with combat, and therefore plans for war must
also consider combat. Furthermore, deterrence strategies,
if they are to remain effective, must consider their ability
to prevail in combat. By thus increasing the credibility of
threat, combat capability strengthens deterrence; and it gives
57 This is addressed in Michael Howard, "The Forgotten
Dimensions of Strategy," p. 107. Recent work in this area
appear to recognize the false separation of combat and
threat. See, for example, Joseph D. Douglass, "U.S. Strategy
for General Nuclear War," International Security Review
,
Fall
1980, pp. 287-316; Donald M. Snow, "Current Nuclear Deterrence
Thinking," International Studies Quarterly
, Sept. 1979, pp.
445-486; Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a
Theory of Victory," International Security , Summer 1979, pp.
54-87; and Desmond Ball, "U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would
They be Used?" International Security , Winter 1982/85, pp.
31-60.
Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War," p. 248.
59
"National Style in Strategy," pp. 42-45
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us confidence in our abilities should open hostilities break
out. Combat and threat form a continuum, and thus both are
within the environment of strategy. Liddell Hart, though
theorizing on a tactical level, supports this hypothesis.
Speaking of the commander:
"...hlb tnue aim lb not bo much to ieefe battle a* to
beek a btn.atz.glc. situation &o advantagoub that i&
It doeb not o jj ltbel{ piodu.cz the decision, lt& con-
tinuation by battle l& bune to achieve thlb."^ Q
Strategies must be geared toward the capability in the future
to fight and win an engagement, whether that engagement is
ever actually fought or not, and plans must be drafted with
such a focus continuously in mind.
"The whole of military activity must therefore relate
directly or indirectly to the engagement. The end
for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and
trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating,
drinking, and marching lb blmply that he bhould ilght
at the light place and the night tlme."6l
Another drawback of a rigid, pre-defined strategy in this
environment of uncertainty is that it assumes only one type
of war. Under such conditions a state may seek only to
"terminate" the war, which ignores the requirements that
62policy may lay on strategy. " In fact, a fundamental
60 Strategy, p. 339.
61 Clausewitz, On War , 1:2:95.
Harry Summers discusses the concept of "conflict
termination" in the concluding chapter to the U.S. Army War
College version of On Strategy . He argues the value of such
a construct in separating war and peace, but, by suggesting
that it is the Army's duty to secure a certain peace, he comes
35

distinction of the types of war exists, a distinction which
clearly acknowledges the dominant role of policy. This dis-
tinction was first developed by Clausewitz, and was labeled
by him the dual nature of war. The duality deals with the
political object of the endeavor, whether it be limited or
total. As war moves from its limited nature toward its total
nature, the effect of policy diminishes. This continues until
the theoretical ideal which Clausewitz describes as "absolute
war" is attained. At this logical extreme, policy has no
role, and war is completely autonomous. In reality, this
ideal can never be reached, for the reason that friction
inhibits the smooth conduct of war.
dangerously close to separating military action from policy.
On Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies
Institute,' U.S. Army War College, 1981), p. 112. The danger
of such a concept of mission is superbly highlighted in Peter
Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare From Indochina to Algeria




64 Friction refers to those elements of war such as danger,
exhaustion, lack of information on the enemy, and spacial and
temporal constraints, which all act to reduce its tempo and
destructiveness . On War
,
1:7, The use of theoretical
extremes and dialectical pairs is one of the trademarks of
Clausewitz. For example, as Bernard Brodie illustrates:
"...he first insists that the use of force is theoretically
without limits and then goes on to explain why it must in




We are thus left with two types of war: total and
limited. In a note written several years before his death,
Clausewitz expressed his intention to rework the text of
On Wa* to better highlight this concept of duality. The note
provides a concise statement of the distinction between total
and limited war:
"War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the
objective is to ove.fLtkn.ou) the enemy- -to render him
politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus
forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or
me.A.e.Zy to occupy tome o^ k<L& hn.ontlen-d.Liitn.icti* so
that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at
the peace negotiations." 65
Therefore, in total war, one seeks the complete destruction
of the enemy, including occupation of his territory and the
dismantling of his government. In order to accomplish this
aim, the enemy's armed forces must first be defeated. Total
war thus involves higher risks and prizes, and relies heavily
on the employment of military force to reduce the enemy.
Because of its total nature, the political and military aims
will tend to be the same, and "...the more military and less
f\ 7
political will war appear to be."
Limited war, in contrast, has as its objective the
exacting of certain concessions from the enemy. As Clausewitz
argues, these concessions can range from
"Two Notes by the Author on His Plans for Revising
On Waft: Note of 10 July 1327," in On War
,
p. 69.








"...tkz conquest oh hl6 to.mi4.toKy, to a t2.mp0Ka.Ky
occupation ok Invasion, to pKO j ect* with an Immediate
political puKpote, and finally to pattlvely awaiting
the enemy' i> attack*. Any one of these may^be used
to overcome the enemy's will: the choice depends on
circumstances , "68
Under these conditions, the political and military aims
diverse ,"... the less will the military element's natural
tendency to violence coincide with political directives."
Since war is but a tool of policy, it must, in this case,
submit totally to the dictates of the master. Otherwise the
danger exists that the armed forces may go too far, causing
an undesired political affect, such as escalation or
over -ex tens ion
.
While in both total and limited war, the enemy's will to
fight must be broken, in the latter, this objective is at-
tained with less military force. The lower costs of surrender
and the lower level of commitment of both sides inherent in a
limited war means that less coercion is necessary to bend the
enemy's will:
"The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent
the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you;
the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need





The prime example of the loss of political control over
the military in a limited war may be found in the French
experience in Algeria. Here the army felt it knew, better
than the government, what was good for France, and forced the






political aim, the less importance you attach to it




Furthermore, as Liddell Hart argues:
"It should, equally, be a principle of policy, especially
in war, to provide your opponent with a ladder by which
he can climb down."'
2
Policy must maintain control, and must continue to provide the
overall purpose for, and aim of the conflict.
This leads to two very important conclusions for the
strategist. The first is that before entering into a conflict,
whether it be as the aggressor or as the defender, the choice
of the type of war must be made:
"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of
judgment that the statesman and commander have to make
is to establish. .. the kind of war on which they are
embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to
turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."'
The second conclusion derives directly from the first, and it
is that
"...war is not a mere act of policy but a true political
instrument, a continuation of political activity by
other means.'!74
In the distinction between war as an "act of policy" and war
as a "political instrument," lies the most fundamental of
Clausewitz's arguments: Wan. 16 6u.boid.A,natzd to polZcy, and






On War , 1:1:88. Our failure to do this in Vietnam forms
one of the major themes of Col. Summers' On Strategy , see
especially pp. 185-187.
74 Clausewitz, On War , 1:1:87.
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inzizfioie. AM not iti> e.qu.a.1; wax. i& not policy itbzli, bat i±
inAtzad -it* tool. Thus, war is a continuous spectrum- -from
limited to total--and it is itself only a part of the larger
spectrum of international relations. This spectrum is repre-
sented at one end by unification, such as was accomplished
in America in 1787, or in Germany in 1871; at the other end if
war, the most extreme of which is total war; and in between
lie the myriad of forms which the relations between states
assume
.
While these conclusions may seem basic, they are not com-
monly accepted in America. It is part of the American charac-
ter that war is considered as an autonomous activity, separate
from politics. As Harry Summers points out:
"World Wars I and II had been not so much wars as crusades
to punish evil. Even so astute a military professional
as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur saw war in this
light. As he told the Senate, 'the general definition
which for many decades has been acceptable was that war
was an ultimate process of politics; that when all^of
the political means failed, we then go to force.'"' 3
Such a misconception was with America in Vietnam, and was
among the causes of the ignorance of both the political nature
of the conflict, and the fact that war is a tool of policy and




76Clausewitz, On War, VIII:6:605
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Since war is a political instrument and in no way breaks
the discourse between nations, its beginning and end are in
reality part of a continuous stream of events. This leads
to the final Clausewitzian concept of import here. Concern-
ing war termination, Clausewitz writes that,
"...even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to
be regarded as final. The defeated state often con-
siders the outcome merely as a transitory evil..."''
If the war is fought for purely military reasons, such as was
World War I, then the tendency is to exact revenge through the
7 8peace treaty. If, however, the war is fought "...in constant
regard to the peace you desire" (that is for a political pur-
pose), then revenge looses its importance, and a just and
79hopefully lasting peace may be obtained. Only in such a
case does one stand to win both the war and the peace.
The environment of strategy, then, is one of chance and
passion; of rational policy planning; and of continuity. It
is continuity which allows its application to circumstances
and events short of war. The environment is continuous in




As Brodie writes: "...if we seek historical examples of
failure to match military design with political purpose, with
measureless unhappy consequences, World War I is exhibit number
one." War and Politics
,





TeVeliglFful nature of the Versailles peace
treaty.
Hart, Strategy, p. 551.
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and must act along a spectrum from limited to total war. Since
limited war involves as much threat as combat, the connection
with cold war is easily made. Cold war is nothing more than
an intense interaction, a powerplay, between rival states. In
short, strategy must operate along the entire spectrum of
international relations; the environment is therefore con-
tinuous in this aspect. Secondly, the environment is con-
tinuous with respect to time. Since no act occurs that is
not a response to some previous act; and since no act is final,
the environment pertains equally throughout time. Con-
sequently, through continuity, the environment of strategy is
seen to apply at all times and in all interactions between
sovereign states.
To reinforce this point, consider the definition of limited
war offered above. It was argued that this type of war is one
of limited concessions. These concessions can be won, in fact,
without resort to actual combat when the opponent perceives
that the cost of resistance will be higher than that of
conceding. In an era of nuclear deterrence, this concept has
taken the form of "coercive diplomacy" or the "diplomacy of
8
1










Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 2.
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a protracted struggle; not necessarily an armed one, but a
struggle nonetheless. In the truest tradition of Clausewitz,
they emphasize the subordination of strategy and force to
policy, and, more importantly, stress the use of force for
coercion:
"Moscow views the struggle as political in essence, but
taking numerous forms -- ideological , economic, and dip-
lomatic, with the diplomatic definitely comprehending
the military-diplomatic." 82
Possony and Pournelle, with their argument that America
is at war now, echo this diverse and essentially psychological
concept of the use of military force:
"The United States is at war. Whether we consider this
to be the Protracted Conflict initiated in 1917 by the
Bolsheviks or something new brought about by the march
of technology in this century, the war is taking place
and it cannot be escaped. The field of engagement is
not everywhere bloody. Except for financial sacrifices,
many citizens of the West and subjects of Communism may
be unaware that the conflict has been going on until
the decisive moment, if it ever comes, is upo-n them." 8 -3
Yet, war is generally defined as a state of open, armed,
and often prolonged conflict carried on between nations. In-
stead of war, Possony and Pournelle, and the Soviets are in
fact addressing peaceful, though tense, relations between
rival powers; relations that have existed for ages, from Athens
and Sparta to England and Germany. There is indeed a strug-
gle taking place, but it is not a war. It is in reality






Strategy of Technology, p. 1
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That both the American authors and the Soviet leader-
ship consider the relations between the two nations to be
"war," or a life and death struggle, suggests that the differ-
ence between peace and war is ill-defined. Andre Beaufre
argues that this is in fact the case, a result of nuclear
deterrence
:
"But peace has no longer the absolute character it had
in the last century: today it is possible to hurl in-
sults at a nation, burn down its embassy, arrest its
ships, send hired assassins into its country or give
almost open support to political parties without war
breaking out; formerly all this would have been
unthinkable. Peace between contending nations has
become 'war in peacetime ' of cold war. "34
That both Americans and Soviets argue for the application
of classical strategic principles in the pursuit of "victory"
suggests that the environment of strategy applies to these
cases as well as outright conflict. In fact, there is nothing
in logic which opposes the conclusion that the environment of




As Clausewiti would do, let us turn to the real world for
evidence to support this conclusion. The first question must
be whether passion is present in all levels of international
relations. In answer, one must merely consider the response
to the seizure of American embassv personnel by Iranian
S -l Deterrence and Strategv, po . 29-50
Edward M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy , Introduction,
p . viii .
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militants. There was no war, yet there was certainly passion
and violence. Just as the stakes involved change over the
range of the spectrum, so too does the level of passion. In
total war passion is extremely high, while in the day to day
relations between allies, it is low. Nevertheless, it is
always there. Indeed, Clausewitz does not qualify passion
except to state that the proper level must be present in the
people before embarking on an endeavor. Thus, before signing
a treaty or granting funds to a nation, as well as before
committing forces to battle, the support of the people must be
present
.
The second issue is whether or not the full spectrum of
international relations permits the play of chance. Again,
one need only consider history for an answer. With what degree
of certainty should we have built up a "Twin Pillar" policy in
the Persian Gulf, depending on Iran and Saudi Arabia to defend
the region? That we did so with a high degree of confidence
only serves to the discredit of our statesmanship. Since
international relations involves the interaction of individ-
uals and institutions from widely divergent cultural and
historical backgrounds, chance cannot be ruled out. As
Americans, no matter how hard the Russian culture and insti-
tutions are studied, we cannot hope to be able to predict
their actions. Indeed, it is when we feel certain of their
q c.
James H. Noyes, The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security
and U.S. Policv, 2 ed. (Stanford, Ca, : Hoover Institution
Press, 1982), pp. 120-121.
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behavior that we should become concerned, for it is then
that we become overconfident and run the risk of missing
important signals.
Finally, the role of policy and of rational policy plan-
ning are unquestionable. Indeed, since control over passion
is weak, and is non-existent over chance, if there is to be
any control over events for one's own ends, the importance of
streamlining and improving the planning process becomes
essential. Policy, and the planning process which accompanies
it, are the only elements of the environment over which men
may exert some control
.
The environment of strategy is one of uncertainty, temporal
continuity, and one that pertains to the whole of international
relations. Its elements, as described in this chapter, affect
the implementation of strategy. Strategy cannot operate
outside of its bounds; and plans which develop the specific
chain of events of an endeavor cannot succeed unless they are
fabricated with this environment as a guide. The environment
of strategy, the fundamental environment of international
relations, is the milieu which constrains and animates the
whole of security planning. It is this standpoint, as
Clausewitz suggests, which will allow the formation of an
integrated view of world events, and that will in turn allow
a degree of consistency in planning and behavior. It is the
foundation upon which to build a concept of strategy.
46

III. STRATEGY: A METHOD OF THOUGHT
"StKatzgy cannot be. a single defined doctnlne,
it i& a me.th.od oj thought
, the object o& which.
16 to codify events, 6zi them In oKdeK ofa
pK4.onJ.ty and then zhoo&z the. most elective
couKSe o& action. TheKe will be a special
6tKa.te.gy to bit each situation; any given
stKategy may be the best possible. In centaln
situations and the woKSt conceivable, in otheKs."
S 7Andne Seau&Ke
Strategy is a complex subject. It has no answers; only
informed opinion and judgment, based on a study of history.
In an era of positivism, materialism, and quantitative analy-
sis, such indeterminacy is discomforting. Yet, because of the
uncertain environment of strategy, planners and decision-
makers must accept indeterminacy and must accommodate them-
8 8
selves to it if the plans they develop are to know success.
There are no answers; nothing is final; nothing is certain.
The only hope for success under these conditions is to develop




For a discussion of the acceptance of indeterminacy see





[Boston : Beacon Press, 1957) . Nineteenth
Century Philosophers such as Charles Saunders Pierce, William
James and John Dewey develop the theoretical foundation for
such pragmatism, while William J. Meyer, in Public Good and
Political Authority: A Pragmatic Proposal (Port Washington,
N . Y . : Kennikat Press, 1975)
,
provides a more recent treatment
of the subject. For a discussion of the intellectual ante-
cedents of moderity, see Albert N. Levi, Philosophy and the




an approach to strategy that is flexible; one that acknowledges
its true environment. As Beaufre posits, "strategy cannot be
a single defined doctrine," but must be instead a "method of
89thought." It is the purpose of this chapter to suggest such
an approach.
The environment of strategy is continuous with respect to
time as long as the nation state system continues to be the
predominant political and sociological unit. Because of this,
use may be made of history, which "...gives perspective to the
problems of the present and drives home the point that there
9Dis really very little new under the sun." Without history,
strategy would be forced to rely solely on current events and
present day analytical techniques, which, though essential,
would alone drive it to a form of relativism. But, with the
aid of history, a broad conceptual framework of strategy may
be defined. It will provide a stable reference point from
which the course of society may be plotted.
Thus, it is history that provides a firm foundation in an
otherwise fluid environment. This foundation applies not only
to the political and military fields, but also to social and
89
This concept is supported by numerous strategists. See
especially, Clausewitz, On War ; Liddell Hart, Strategy ; and
Possony and Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology .
90James B. Stockdale, "Educating Leaders," The Washington
Quarterly, Winter 83, p. 50.
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cultural. That is to say, culture is the product of history.
In that this is so, if strategy is based on the values and
ideals of the national culture, it develops a relatively firm
base from which to fulfill its task. On the other hand, any
strategy that fails to build on its cultural foundation- -one
that is in fact detached from it—will be cast adrift in the
sea of change, will loose perspective, will be relegated to
merely reacting to the present and will therefore be unable
to guide a nation toward its long term goals.
The task at hand is to first discuss those cultural
ideals- -the national values- -and then to develop a framework
which connects strategy to them. The result will be a concept
that links the values of a nation, through interests and
policy, to strategy, and provides those responsible for the
development of plans of action with some form of guidance in
the solution of day to day events. Strategy becomes a guide
that frees them from a sole reliance on the present, and
allows them to shape and pursue a course into the future.
A. NATIONAL VALUES AND INTERESTS
National values are those general principles of philosophy
and ideology which give a nation its unique character. They
are the product of a combination of inheritance, history, and
environment (both physical and political). In America, the
national values include liberalism, federalism, republicanism,
49

91individualism, and optimism. As Henry Steel Commager
writes
:
"The forces that create a national character are as
obscure as those that create an individual character,
but that both are formed early and change relatively
little is almost certain."
The national values in turn form the relatively solid
anchor upon which a concept of strategy may be built. More
than just providing a starting point in this framework though,
91The exact identify of these values is subject to debate
and will not be addressed in detail here. The following select
list of works on the subject that are key to any study of the
national character, is provided in lieu of an actual discussion
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Garden City, N.Y.:
Harper § Row, 1966); George Santayana, Character and Opinion in
the United States ; Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in
American Thought
,
2 vols. (New York: Harcourt, Brace $ World,
1926} ; Charles and Mary Beard, America in Midpassage
,
2 vols.
(New York: Macmillan, 1939); Ralph H. Gabriel, The Course of
American Democratic Thought (New York: Ronald Press, 1940);
Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the
Men Who Made It (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Harold J.
Laski , The American Democracy: A Commentary and An Interpreta-
tion (New York: The Viking Press, 1948); Morton White, Social
Thought in America ; Henry Steel Commager, The American Mind ;
Frederick L. Allen, The Big Change: America Transforms Itse'lf,
1900-1950 (New York: Harper g Row, 1952); Louis Hartz, The
Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace §
Wo r 1 d , 1955) ; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From
Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage, 1 9 5 5 J ; Walter Lippmann,
Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown §
Co . ,' 1955) ; Dennis W. Brogan, The American Character (New
York: Time, 1962); Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The
Democratic Experience (New York: Random House, 1975) ; Godfrey
Hodgson, America in "Our Time (New York: Doubleday, 1976); and
finally, Theodore H. White, America in Search of Itself:
Making' of the President
,
1956-1980 (New York: Harper 5 Row,
1982) .
92The American Mind, p. 409.
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values also play a role in the practical world. They represent
the nation, but they are also reflected on the individuals
within that nation. Each person operates under these values
to a greater or lesser degree. In this way, the national
values form a set of vague constraints on the types of strate-
gies a nation employs. The Soviet planner, for example, would
tend to preempt rather than be surprised, while the American
would tend to rule our preemption in the hope of negotiation.
Thus, national values are seen to have a dual role, one in
formulating the background for the national interests and the
other in constraining the means that may be used to further
those interests
.
These values derive their substance from the nation state
system operative in the world today. In such a system, states
take on identities of their own which cannot be represented
by any individual or group within that state:
"The state provides the legal continuity of the national
society. It thus enables the individual to experience
the nation as a continuum in time and space, as a per-
sonality in whose name men act, who demands and
receives services and bestows benefits, to whom one
can feel personal loyalties that are felt toward few
g
.
other social groups except the family and the church."
Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet
Strategic Thought," in Soviet Military Thinking
,
ed , Derek
Leebaert (London: George Allen § Unwin, 1981)
, pp . 62-66.
94Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle
for Power and Peace
,





Governments, in turn, exist to defend these broad concepts.
Since governments are run by individuals, complex institutional
arrangements have been developed to ensure that the interests
of the nation and not of its individual members are projected.
What this suggests is that the state is composed of more
than just the sum of its parts, the relations between these
parts and between the outside world, and the members who both
precede and follow the current generation, must also be
included. Consequently, the national values and interests are
in fact the values and interests of the sum, not the sum of
the values and interests of the various groups within the state
Walter Lippmann argues:
"...this corporate being, though so insubstantial to our
senses, binds, in Burke's words, a man to his country
with 'ties which though light as air, are as strong as
links of iron.' That is why young men die in battle
for their country's sake and why old men plant trees
they will never sit under. "95
For Americans, this concept is all the more important,
since we are an amalgamation of various cultures, a melting
pot for the world. The national identity lies in its values
96
and ideals, not in its territory or anthropological identity.
Because America lacks an identity firmly set either in history
95 Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown
§ Co., 1955; Mentor paperback, 1955), p. 55.
96
For a contemporary analysis of the heterogeneity of the
United States, its thus fragile cohesion and the links that
bond it together, see Joel Garreau, The Nine Nations of North




or in a single culture, its reason for being is idealistic.
The nation represents not a given territory or people, but a
concept: llbzity. A concept, though is not tangible, not
practical, and not quantifiable, which runs counter to the
expectations of today's society. Yet ideas are important,
as Lippmann suggests:
"The airy nothings in the realm of essence are efficacious
in the existential world when a man, believing it to be
true or good, treats the idea as if it were the reality.
In this way faith in an idea can quite literally remove
a mountain." 97
America the dream, America the ideal, and America the
concept are best described by George Santayana:
"As it happens, the symbolic American can be made largely-
adequate to the facts; because, if there are immense
differences between individual Americans - -for some
Americans are black--yet there is a great uniformity
in their environment, customs, temper, and thoughts.
They have all been uprooted from their several soils
and ancestries and plunged together into one vortex,
whirling irresistibly in a space otherwise quite empty.
To bz an Amzi-ican X.A & -Lt&zlfa aZmoit a moxal cond-Lt-lon,
an nducatZo n, and a catizzx. Hence a single ideal fig-
ment can cover a large part of what each American is
in his character, and almost the whole of what Americans
are in their social outlook and political judgments." 9 ^
(Emphasis added)
America is a young nation, a mere infant when compared to
the older powers of the world such as England, Russia and
China. For the major part of its history, it has basked in





Character and Opinion in the United States , p. 104.
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Not for America the harsh realities of war and devastation,
realities that other nations took for granted. There were no
invasions, no plagues, no famines, and few threats, to burst
the bubble of youth. America was a country of endless oppor-
tunity, with nothing on the horizon but wealth, posterity and
99peace
.
In such an environment, the national interests favored
excessively the side of liberty and economic expansion, to
the neglect of security. Not until World War II thrust it
into the role of a world power did security become a serious
concern. Although it was not appreciated at the time, this
turn of events gave rise to an identity crisis, as America
the prosperous, the peace loving, the isolationist, was forced
to play the power game with the world. *" It might be said
99 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little,
Brown $ Co., 1979), pp. 55-61.
For a discussion of this concept see George F. Kennan,
American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1951). On the youthfulness of America, its lack of a
feudal tradition and the consequent differences between
European and American Liberalism, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal
Tradition in America
. Finally, on the moderate nature of the
American political culture, see Richard Hofstadter, The
American Political Tradition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).
Huntington, Soldier and State
,
p. 545.
102Writing in 1950, Commager states that far from causing
an identity crisis, W,W.II confirmed the myths of the limitless
power, uniqueness and superiority of America, American Mind
,
p. 431. But, writing in 1968 he highlights their "anachronis-
tic quality," and their true nature as myths. The Defeat of
America: Presidential Power and the National Character (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), p. 42.
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that this identity crisis is in a way our adolescence as a
nation. The growing pains have been significant, compounded
by the "acne" of such events as Vietnam and Watergate.
Now, at last, as America's relative economic power de-
clines and as the quantity and quality of the threat increases,
it is beginning to see the need to get serious about national
security, that it is not a temporary thing, and that it is
not for the untrained. D As a world power in the nuclear
103
The relative decline of America is discussed by Kissinger,
who argues that, as of the late 1960's, we had come to realize
limits on our national power. White House Years
,
Chap. 3. A
discussion of the swing of the economic pendulum is contained
in Godfrey Hodgson, America In Our Time
,
Chap. 12. For a force-
ful statement of an <xbi,olat<i decline in American power, see
Andrew Hacker, The End of The American Era (New York: Antheneum,
1970). A different view of the "decline" is posed by Lippmann,
who, though writing before the late 1960's, suggests that a
new agenda is in order, that "we have fulfilled and outlived
most of what we used to regard as the program of our national
purpose." The National Purpose . A symposium (New York: Holt,
Rinehart § Winston, 1960), p. 126. Numerous works have ap-
peared recently that urge a review of our national security
apparatus. For an overview of the system and its shortcomings,
see John Collins, U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press , 1982) . Harrv GT Summers ' On Strategy:
A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Ca . : Presidio
Press
, 198 2) contains a superb analysis of the problems en-
countered during Vietnam, viewed from a Clausewitzian
perspective. For a comprehensive study of how the system
should be, see Stefan T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The
Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War (Cambridge,
Mass
. : Dune 11 en, 1970) ; and for a recommendation in the form
of historical analogy, see Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand
Strategy of the Roman Empire (Baltimore, Md . : The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1976). Many works have been pro-
duced on military reform. See, for example, Philip S. Kronen-
berg, ed. , Planning U.S. Security: Defense Policy in the
Eighties (New York: Pergamon, 1982) ; James Fallows , National
Defense (New York: Random House, 1981); Thomas E. Etzold,
Defense or Delusion? Americans Military in the 1980s (New
York: Harper § Row, 1982); Gen. David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.),
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age, foreign relations as a whole, and defense in particular
have become full time affairs:
"In fact, since the total strategy of deterrence is
constantly in action, the defence function has also
become a continuous operation instead of being res-




As was mentioned above, there are no answers and nothing is
final. A concept of strategy must be developed which is
based on the relatively unchanging national values, not just
for the sake of sound strategic planning, but also to foster
an understanding of what America is. As Americans, we must
come to understand our position in the world, and our role
in shaping the future. Only in this way may we presume to
be a "world leader."
"What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," The New York
Times Magazine
,
Nov. 1982); Steven L. Canby, "Military Reform
and the Art of War," International Security Review , Fall 1982,
pp. 245-268; VAdm James B. Stockdale, USN (Ret.), "Educating
Leaders," The Washington Quarterly
,
Winter 1983, pp. 49-52;
Col. William J. Taylor, Jr., USA (Ret.) "Leading the Army,"
The Washington Quarterly
, Winter 1983, pp. 40-45; and Gen.
Edward C. Meyer, USA, "The JCS: How Much Reform is Needed?"
Armed Forces Journal International
,
Apr. 1982, pp. 82-90.
For the military establishment's side of the debate, see
Jeffrey S. McKitrick, "A Military Look at Military Reform,"
Comparative Strategy
,
Vol. 4 No. 1, 198 5, pp. 51-64; and
Lt. Col. Walter Kross, USAF , Military Reform: Past and
Present," Air University Review
,
Jul. -Aug. 1981, pp. 101-108.
Finally, for reform arguments tied to specific examples or
operational concepts, see Jeffrey Record, The Rapid Deploy-
ment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf
(Washington, D .C . : Corporate Press, 1981) ; and Richard K.
Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washing-
ton, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982).





In gaining this understanding, the importance of values
cannot be overstated, and they should not be taken for
granted. As Walter Lippmann warns:
"The acquired culture is not transmitted in our genes,
and so the issue is always in doubt. The good life
in the good society, though attainable, is never
attained and possessed once and for all. So what has
been attained will again be lost if the wisdom of the
good life in a good society is not transmitted." 105
He goes on to argue that if these values are forgotten,
institutions loose their meaning and become hollow. 106 The
stage is then set for demagogues and fanatics "...either to
divide the nation to the point of paralysis or to gather unto
themselves sufficient power in order to rip the society away
10 7from its democratic moorings." The significance of values
increases exponentially when one takes into consideration
that this era is one of indirect strategy (discussed in detail
below), which places far greater emphasis on non-military
tools of power , of which the more significant is psychological
Public Philosophy
,
p. 75. For a study of Walter Lipp-
mann, his life and his philosophy, the definitive work is
Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston




Paul A.C. Koistinen, The Military- Industrial Complex:
A Historical Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 18-19.
In light of the arguments of both Lippmann and Koistinen, it
might be inferred that perhaps a greater threat to our way of
life lies in the historical and political shallowness of our
officer training programs. This argument is echoed explicitly
by Bernard Brodie in War and Politics
,
ch. 10; and implicitly





power. Thus, values, if they are taught and well known by
the people (and the military), can be a great source of
strength. On the other hand, if they are lost, America, a
nation built on a concept of values, is also lost.
Even before addressing the national interests then, there
develops a threat to the nation that arises from within; a
sort of cancer. This threat may in fact be more serious than
any other. While Rome fell due to a love of luxury, it is
generally accepted that that love had as its antecedent a loss
of those values that had made it strong. Part of strategy
then, must be devoted to the articulation of those values,
1 OQperhaps in the field of political strategy.
As was suggested above, the national interests are formed
by a synthesis of the national values and the nation state
system. Likewise, it is the purpose of the national interests
to safeguard and preserve the national values. Because of
this, it becomes apparent that the national interests are not
to be found in Israel or El Salvador but within this nation
itself. In a more general construct, the national interests
is that set of concerns which is designed to ensure the
sovereignty of a nation in an inherently hostile and anarchic
10 8
Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy
,
p. Ill
109 Such a concept is disliked in this nation because it
hints at "indoctrination." But, should we, as a result foster





world; and sovereignty is taken to mean the right and the




The literature on the national interests is extensive.
Some of the more noteworthy pieces are cited here: Hans J.
Morgenthau, "The Mainspring of American Foreign Policy:
National Interest vs Moral Abstractions," American Political
Science Review
,
Dec. 1950, pp. 833-854; and "Another Great
Debate: The National Interests of the United States," American
Political Science Review
, Dec. 1952, pp. 961-988; Walter
Lippmann, Essays In the Public Philosophy ; Warner Schilling,
"The Clarification of Ends or Which Interest is the National?"
World Politics
, 8, 1956, pp. 566-578; GlendonA. Schubert, Jr.,
The Public Interest in Administrative Decision Making,"
American Political Science Review
, June 1957, pp. 546-368;
Arthur S. Miller, "Foreword: The Public Interest Undefined,"
Journal of Public Law
,
vol. 10, 1961 svmposium, pp. 184-202;
Carl Friedrich, ed
.
, The Public Interest (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press) 1962; Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom
and Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 1963); Richard Flathman,
The Public Interest (New Random House, 1963); Richard Flathman,
The Public Interest (New York: Wiley, 1966); Virginia Held,
The Public Interest and Individual Interests (New York: Basic
Books, 1970); Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson,
Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American
Businessmen (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1975); Paul
Seabury, "The Moral and Philosophical Bases of American Foreign
Policy," Orbis
,
Spring 1976, pp. 5-14; Hans Morgenthau, "The
Founding Fathers and Foreign Policy: Implication for the Late
Twentieth Century," Orbis
,
Spring 1976, pp. 15-26; Kenneth W.
Thompson, "American Foreign Policy: Values Renewed or Discovered,"
Orbis
,
Spring 1976, pp. 125-136; William Kintner, "A Program
for America: Freedom and Foreign Policy," Orbis
,
Spring 1977,
pp. 139-156; Donald E. Nuechterlein , National Interest and
Presidential Leadership: The Setting ot Priorities (Boulder,
Colo
. : Westview Press, 1978) ; and finally, Alexander L. George
and Robert 0. Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests:
Uses and Limitations," in Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign
Policy by A.L. George (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980).
For a short summary of the interest literature, see Fred A.
Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis
,
Spring 1977, pp. 121-128. Indictments of the utility of the
national interest concept are contained in Stanley Hoffmann,
Primacy of World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold
War (New York: McGraw-Hill , 19 78) ; and Robert 0. Keohane and
Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition (Boston: Little, Brown $ Co., 1977).
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In seeking to identify national interests then, one must
look, not for the interests of any group or individual within
the nation, but for those of the nation itself. In other
words, the nation is an entity onto itself, and it thus has
its own interests. As such, the national interests are above
debate. They are the product of the environment, not of
politics
.
The national interests are the result of the cultural
heritage of a people as well as the nation state system means
that each nation will at once have its own unique interests,
while at the same time, will share interests in common with
other nations. For example, the United States and the Soviet
Union both share the common interest of security; but, the
Soviet Union, because of its history and environment, values
security above personal liberty, while the United States,
because of its history and environment, places greater
emphasis on liberty than on security.
Following the logic described above, the national interests
of the United States find their origin within the nation. In
Federalist 25, Alexander Hamilton discusses the purposes of
the Union, from which can be derived our national interests:
In fact, it has been argued that Americans see their
armed forces less as protectors of their security than as




"The principal purposes to be answered by union are
these- -the common defense of the members; the preserva-
tion of the public peace, as well against internal con-
vulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce
with other nations and between the States; the superintend-




The national interests which can be developed from this state-
ment are security, liberty, and economic well being.
Se.cu.ii.ty is the first interest which is essential. George
and Keohane call it physical survival (of our population)
which in our era is "...always in jeopardy." What must
also be included in this definition is the maintenance of
sovereignty, of territorial integrity, and, though often taken
for granted, of the Union.
The second interest is Zi.be.lty : the maintenance of the
American form of government, its institutions, and its
freedoms. This interest refers not only to external threats,
but also to those which arise from within. It is this interest
that most directly represents America's values, and that dis-
tinguishes it from other nations in the world. In turn, how-
ever, this concept combines with that of security to create
a dilemma: the demands of security conflict directly with
those of liberty. A nation run mainly in the interest of
1 1 2




Alexander L. George and Robert 0. Keohane, "The Concept
of National Interests: Uses and Limitations," in Presidential
Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy , by A.L. George (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1980], p. 224.
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security, such as the Soviet Union, invariably destroys the
liberty of its people. In contrast, a nation which values
too much its liberty, risks conquest, as was visited on the
city-states of ancient Greece. This dialectical tension must
be mastered if the United States is to provide security and
the blessings of liberty.
The final interest is zc.onomi.CL will being . In the
Constitution, one finds that the Union is dedicated to
promoting "...the general Welfare." While the term is broad
and can be included within the interest of liberty, it also
connotes something more. That something extra is the economy
and the way it supports the American standard of living.
Again, this interest is not necessarily subordinate or less
important than the two previous ones. Without its standard of
living, or in the worst case, without economic subsistence,
either the nation or its liberty would not survive.
These are the national interests. They take account of
the values of the nation and the Constitution. In the end,
they serve as guidelines for national policy. The national
interests are the mainsprings of any action the government
should take. Adherence to them, while not guaranteeing public
support, at least ensures us that the core values are being





National policy represents a synthesis of the national
interests and the international environment. Whereas na-
tional interests respond to internal demands, policy responds
to external, thereby linking the core values to the inter-
national system. It reacts to fundamental changes in the
international structure to protect the interests of the
nation. Taken this way, national policy is created by the
milieu within which the nation exists, and not by the desires
of its leaders or the political process. National policy is
in fact a broad consensus objective of the nation, such as
world peace or national self-determination.
In so defining national policy, the national interests
are divorced even farther from the commonly accepted idea.
This is to say that the national interests are more a product
of national identity and environment than narrow objectives
in various geographical regions throughout the world. - They
are thus of an internal nature vice an external one. Because
of this, foreign relations cannot be based directly on the
national interests. What is needed is a function that
synthesizes the requirements of the national interests and
the realities of the international system. This is the role
of national policy.
114
K.J. Holsti separates the "immutable national interests
such as security from lesser goals, to which he ascribes the
concept of the "cbjec^ve." International Politics: A Frame -





By thus separating the metaphysical concept of the national
interest from foreign relations, the rigidity of dogma and
ideology is lessened. Policy, by definition is more able to
adapt to the fluid international environment, whereas the
national interests are largely ignorant of it. To call
policy 'national interests,' as many do, detaches it from the
core values of a nation because it disregards the true national
interests. It is cast adrift, able to react only to the inter-
national system and the pressures of special interest groups.
Policy then ceases to provide direction and guidance for
strategy. By contrast, if the relationship between policy and
the national interest is maintained, policy acquires a meas-
ure against which it may evaluate changes in the international
arena. It is provided a firm foundation based, in the end, on
the core values of the nation, which gives it the flexibility
needed to adapt. to the fluid international environment. This
in turn allows policy to provide the firm foundation necessary
for the development of sound strategy.
Policy provides the broad goal which strategy must strive
to achieve; it sets forth what must be attained if the national
interests are to be upheld in the given international arena.
Thus, where values and interests determine wku a nation does
what it does, policy defines who, t it must do, and strategy
kou) to do it. In this way, policy determines the character
of strategy; whether it is to be aggressive or defensive. In
short, the primary purpose of policy is to form the link
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between the values of the nation and the means at hand; a
purpose that is echoed by Clausewitz:
"It can be taken as agreed that the aim of policy is to
unify and reconcile all aspects of internal administra-
tion as well as of spiritual values, and whatever else
the moral philosopher may care to add. Policy, of
course, is nothing in itself; It i& dimply the. tn.\x^te.e.
fioi all thz&z inte.fio,*t& against the. outride, vooild. . . .
In no sense can the art of war ever be regarded as the
preceptor of policy, and here we can only treat policv
as representative of all interests of the community."115
(Emphasis added)
C. STRATEGY
As was argued at the beginning of this chapter, strategy
is a complex subject. This would be the case even if the
strategy under consideration were only military in nature;
but it is much more so when strategy is that, as well as
economic, diplomatic, and political:
"Everyone knows that war today is total; that is an
acknowledged fact; in other x\rords it will be carried
on in all fields, political, economic, diplomatic
and military. Such, with all its varying shades of
emphasis, is the pattern of the cold war .... Equally
therefore strategy must be total . This requirement
raises in an acute form the problem of the relation-
ship between policy and strategy; at the same time
it will help us to understand what is the true
field of activity of each." 11 ^
Considering policy in light of the preceding discussion, the
"problem of the relationship between policy and strategy" is
resolved. Policy becomes a broad, general guideline for
115 0n War , VII 1 : 6 ; 60.6- 7 .




action, while strategy assumes the role of foreign policy,
trade policy, domestic policy and military strategy. In this
situation, policy continues to guide strategy, but in a
broader sense.
When all of this is combined with the nature of the
environment, the complexity of strategy becomes apparent. It
involves the synthesis of the environment, values, capabil-
ities, resources and politics in an effort to achieve the
object of policy. Strategy is thus the first level of the
framework in which individuals, special interest groups,
technology, and, especially, resource constraints enter the
formula. Until now only requirements have mattered, now these
other factors must be accounted for as well, and a balance
struck.
Later, in order to expand on these ideas and to provide a
framework for strategic planning, it will be convenient to
break strategy down into various levels, but first the con-
cept in general must be addressed in order to understand its
nature, and such a discussion must begin with a definition of
strategy.
In a much simpler age, Clausewitz, concerned with the
application of a nation's army to the conduct of war, defined
strategy as "...the. tue oq znga.gzm2.nt6 ^on. the. obj'zct $
117
wan.." Clearly, this is much too limited a definition for
117 0n War, 11:1:128.
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the present era. Liddell Hart provides a broader definition
of strategy, one that reflects war's increasing scopes:
"...the art of distributing and applying military means to
118fulfill the ends of policy." Notice that this definition
implies that, while military means are being used, the engage-
ment is no longer essential. But this definition, by relying
on "military" means, is also too limited.
The better definition of strategy, one which can be applied
to the entire spectrum of strategy and policy in both peace and
war, is provided by Andre Beaufre:
"It is the art which enables a man, no matter what the
techniques employed, to master the problems set by any
clash of wills and as a result to employ the techniques
available with maximum efficiency. It is therefore the
art of the dialectic of force, or, more precisely, the.
ant ofi the. dtalzctic o $ two opposing will* uuing ^cxcz
to nz&otvz thziA. depute.. "119
The. impoxtancz o£ the. di.alzc.ttc cannot be. ove.n.state.d:
Every issue is a two-headed coin. There are no absolutes, and
to every problem, there are at least two aspects; to con-
centrate for example, one must disperse. For every action
there is an intelligent reaction. Sun Tzu counsels:
"All wasi&a/iz L& ba6zd on dzczptlon. Therefore, when
capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity




"Force" in this sense pertains equally to politics,






far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait
to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. .. .Attack
where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not
expect you."l^U (Emphasis added)
This dialectic allows for the manipulation of the events and
circumstances of international affairs to the degree that
nothing is necessarily as it appears. Every advantage also
has its disadvantage; every victory its costs; every defeat
its gains. For every thesis then, there is an antithesis.
Stn.at2.gy it> the. pn.ocz.6 6 by which thi6 dialectic i6 n2.60lv2.cl.
Within its environment, strategy must seek to determine
the path, indeed the paths, that are to be followed if the
object of policy is to be attained. The nature of the environ-
ment determines the number of paths; the opponent their nature;
and policy their terminus. A point made earlier must now be
re- emphasized : Stnatcgy 2.xi6t6 to 6cnvc the cnd.6 & policy.
It must be firmly subordinated to that higher goal. Strategy
on its own makes no sense, it is cut off from the firm founda-
tion of values and interests, and in such a case is forced
to react only to the environment, without guidance. Strategy
thus becomes blind. Only in subordination to policy, which
is in turn subordinate to the national interests and values,
does strategy gain meaning and purpose. This is the case
whether in peace or war. In addressing the relationship
12Q The Art of War , translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 66-69.
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between war and policy, Clausewitz sheds light on the overall
relationship between 6£/ia.te.gy and policy:
"Subordinating the political point of view to the
military would be absurd, for it is policy that
creates war. Policy is the guiding intelligence
and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No
other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate
the military point of view to the political . ""I
Consider, for example, World War I, which is the prime
illustration of the artificial subordination of political pur-
pose to military aim. Though entered into with the expecta-
tions of a short war, it soon sank into the "blood test"
1 7 2described by Churchill. ~ u Instead of submitting to the
control of policy, which might possibly have resulted in
compromise, the war came to be ruled by emotion and narrow
123
military aims. " The result of this distortion was total
1 24
war, "the pure element of enmity unleashed." " In Wax and
F'oLXXLeA
,
Bernard Brodie eloquently discusses the barriers




Winston S. Churchill, Th e World Crisis , 4 vols. (New
York: Charles Scribners, 1929).
IT-'
Lippmann argues that because of the continuing slaughter
the Western Democracies were forced to "democratize" the war
by enfranchizing the masses in order to gain continuing public
support. By thus shifting the power to govern to the people,




124 Clausewitz, On War, VIII:6:6Q5.
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"We are, in short, confronted not with simple greed but
with some deep psychological need expressed on the
national rather than the personal level. The obsession
from first to last was with winning, with vanquishing
the foe, with showing that one's own strength and will
were greater than his--or at least not less. The ob-
verse of this obsession, and indeed the stronger motiva-
tion, was the fear of losing, of being defeated, and
thus of paying consequences that were in a very real
sense unimaginable. Feeding the latter fear was the
need, growing rapidly more intense as the losses
mounted, for the governments to prove to their peoples
that the sacrifices had not been in vain. It was this
need on each side that was the insuperable one, for it
made compromise impossible. Compromise would represent





The war thus became self -perpetuating ; a war of attrition the
sole object of which was to outlast the enemy, for only his
total defeat was an acceptable recompense for the appalling
losses incurred.
World War I is an extreme example. It clearly illustrates
the danger of allowing strategy to operate independent of
policy. But one must also guard against the over-control of
policy. Communication between policy and strategy must be
two-way; policy provides guidance to strategy, while at the
same time responding to the realities created by it. Once
again, the dialectic emerges, and indeterminacy rises to the
fore. As events unfold, policy must adapt its goals to
reality. Just as strategy must be flexible in order to adapt
to a fluid environment, so too must policy:
X
^War and Politics, p. 25.
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"If we keep in mind that war springs from some political
purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its
existence will remain the supreme consideration in
conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the
political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its
chosen means, a process which can radically change it;
yet the political aim remains the first consideration.
Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and,
in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will
have a continuous influence on them. "126
This two-way communication is repeated at each level of
strategy. As the subordinate level acts on the goal assigned
it, it changes the environment which in turn affects the
higher level. Thus each dictates to its subordinate, but also
reacts to it. Therefore, in the dialectic of things, while
strategy drives tactics, it must also respond to the capabil-
ities they present; and likewise, while policy drives strategy,
it must react to it.
At last the true value of sound strategy begins to unfold:
A process is developed which not -only coordinates application
of the resouces of the nation to the aims of policy, but also
retains the flexibility to adapt to the fluid nature of inter-
national relations. Without the linkages described here,
adaptability looses its meaning. Instead of responding to
the environment under the guidance of policy, strategy is
forced to react only to events as they occur. Each is taken
on its own merits, and not distant objective is sought. Often,




are "made out. of habit or following the fashion of the
1 °7
moment." " Hence the tendency to fight the last war, to
embrace rigid dogma, or, in the words of Henry Kissinger, to
offer "no more than marginal adjustments of the status quo."
If the linkages are firm however, strategy becomes the
course to the future and to the attainment of the objectives
of policy. The method by which the process is manipulated,
by which the course is defined, is planning; which will be
discussed in detail in the following chapter. Without these
linkages, there is no direction; with them, the way becomes
clear. By thus providing a criterion anchored in long term
goals, strategy frees decision-making from the bonds of crisis
management, allowing it to swing with the tide of events,
always remaining true to the goal . No longer is it neces-
sary to take each crisis as it comes, deciding on only the
merits of the given situation. It becomes possible to base
decisions on what one hopes to achieve in the long term.
Having now described the nature of strategy, one more
step must be taken before the discussion may proceed to
strategic planning. That step is to break strategy down
into functional levels. This will provide a link between
the very general nature of the discussion on strategy thus
127 Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy
,
p. 29
128White House Years, p. 35.
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far and the more concrete discussion of planning which follows;
and it will provide the framework within which that discussion
may be developed.
While the hierarchy that will be described shortly has
been titled differently by different authors and is fairly
common, this paper primarily uses the labels and definitions
accorded it by Andre Beaufre. He describes three levels of
1 29
strategy, total, overall and operational. These three
levels correspond fairly closely to the functional divisions
of government, such as, for example, the National Security
Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the individual service
staffs
.
The first level, which Beaufre terms "total" strategy,
will be labeled national strategy here in deference to
American literature. It refers to that level of strategy
which governs the utilization of all of the nation's resources.
Because it is so broad in nature, it must of necessity be a
long term strategy; longer that is than those levels below it,
but shorter than policy. Of course, national strategy is
also applied in crisis situations and in war, but even then
it must take a longer and broader perspective than the lower
level strategies.
It is this level of strategy which addresses the broad
foreign and economic policies, and military strategy. The
12 9 Introduction to Strategy
, pp. 30-33.

relations with specific countries and organizations, for
example, come under the heading of overall strategy, which
is the next level. Thus, national strategy is the first
link between policy and means; it is the first, and the major,
level where fiscal constraints and public debate enter the
calculations. It, like all of the levels, must be adaptable
even though in most instances it has a fairly broad and long
term perspective. It is the means of policy and the ends of
overall strategy.
Q\Jth.a.ll strategy takes the goal assigned it by national
strategy and governs the utilization of resources within the
given fields of power (military, diplomatic, economic, and
political.) Because it is at this level that strategy
really begins to branch out, overall strategies will also
govern the cooperation of the various fields. As an example,
the diplomatic field, by securing basing rights assists the
military field in its job of containment and deterrence.
Finally, overall strategies deal with specific, more time
dependent strategies, such as our foreign relations with
Israel, or the means of containment. Overall strategy is
the means of national strategy and the ends of operational
strategy.
Beaufre divides the organizations which correspond to
the levels of strategy into fields and branches. For example,




OpzKa.tlona.1 strategy governs, the utilization of resources
within a specific branch of a field to attain the ends of its
overall strategy. Those resources include hardware, personnel,
tactics, and logistics (procurement). It is within this level
of strategy that what Beaufre terms logistics strategy is
developed. This strategy refers to the coordinated
development of hardware to support present and future
requirements. It is impossible for this strategy to exist
without the firm linkages emphasized throughout this paper,




Operational strategy is the final level of strategy before
tactics. It provides the guidance and the framework within
which operations are conducted, whether those operations are
military, diplomatic, economic or political in nature. Opera-
tional strategy is guided in turn by overall strategy, which
is itself the tool of national strategy. National strategy
is the means of policy which, being very broad and long term,
is able to account for the overall structure of the inter-
national environment and the national interests. The interests
in turn are derived from the nation state concept and the
1 T 1
Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy
,
p. 32..
In which case that branch will more often than not
assume the worst case and request all of the hardware it




the peculiar experiences of a country which dtermine its
values
.
Thus, the hardware and tactics a nation uses are ir-
revocably linked to the very core values of that nation.
Each level reacts both vertically and, in the case of the
lower levels of strategy, horizontally with those around it.
And every level is subject to the influences of the values of
the nation, both in terms of the goals set to it and the
means available to achieve those goals. Finally, every level
of strategy (from national to operational), as well as policy
itself, is affected by and in turn affects the international
system
.
The net result is a dynamic concept of strategy that res-
ponds and adapts to the conditions around it while at the same
time remaining firmly rooted to the long term goals of the
nation. Such a concept, if properly implemented, can only
result in maximizing efficiency and effectiveness; applying
the minimum resources necessary in a stable manner over time,
while still accounting for the uncertainty that the environ-
ment dictates. If nothing else, such a concept will ultimately
improve public support for the policies of government.
The implementation of this concept, can, as Beaufre
counsels, allow us to build the future:
"Strategy will then be seen to be a pioApe.ctu.6 ^ok
act-ion, continuous action at the present time taken
within the framework of a forecast concept of overall
future evolution; its object is to contribute to
certain possible situations rather than others, the
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choice being a political one. I would even go so far
as to say that according to this concept strategy is
the only practicable 'prospectus' for it seeks not to
gue-64 what the future will be but to build the future
methodically taking as its starting point that which
one wishes to achieve and that which appears to he
feasible." 133
Strategy is the process, the method of thought that will
allow a nation to react successfully to the fluid environment
of international relations, in pursuit of the goals of policy
and the national interests. The method of this process is
planning, to which the discussion now proceeds.
ljJDeterrence and Strategy, p. 167
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IV. PLANNING: THE METHOD OF STRATEGY
"Stia.te.gic. thought must continu.ou.Aly take, the.
&act6 oi change Into account, not only those
oh the. \oh.eseeable hu.tu.fiz but pnobably changes
many yeans ahead. Stn.ate.gy can no longen pnoceed
by a pn.oce.6A o& hlnmly based objective, deduction;
It must woik on hypotheses and pnoduce solutions
by tnuly onlglnal thought . "
Andne Zeau^n.e
While strategy is the philosophy of doctrine, it is plan-
ning that is its architect. Planning must synthesize the
requirements of policy, the resources available, and the
nature of the opponent to be defeated within the context of
strategy to devise doctrine. The process is complex, dealing
as it does not only with awesome weapons and power, sophis-
ticated technology, and rapidly evolving circumstances, but
also with the pervasive unpredictability of the human mind,
which colors all of international relations.
This chapter will discuss the general nature of planning,
its evolution in America and its general environment. As with
the rest of this paper, the discussion in general, not specific;
conceptual, not prescriptive. This chapter links the previous
two very general discussions to the more practical coverage of
the planning process in the following chapter. To provide a




sense of perspective, the discussion first turns to the history
of planning in the United States.
A. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PLANNING
Historically, planning in America has been oriented toward
administration and execution rather than long term development
and concept formulation. ° A society with no desire for
philosophy is unlikely to dwell on strategic theory and the
perspective that that adds to planning. As this implies, the
reasons for such a practical view of planning were historical
and cultural in origin.
It was suggested in the previous chapter that liberalism,
fostered and shielded by America's insular position and Pax
Britannica, gave rise to an inward looking culture. Ignorant
of the outside world, indeed, as some would argue, incapable
of understanding it, America grew up in a vacuum:
"Liberalism never questioned the existence of the state.
Instead it presupposed the state's self-sufficiency
and external security .... [The liberal state] was pre-
sumed to exist -in. vacuo ... .The assumption of a state
in a vacuum was particularly relevant to American
liberalism because for almost a century American
reality approximated the liberal image. M^°
Among the numerous histories of American strategic
thought, a few of the more noteworthy are Russell F. Weigley,
The American Way of War ; Walter Millis, ed., American Military
Thought (New York: Bobbs -Merrill Co., 1966); Maj . C. Joseph
Bernardo, USA, and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy:
Its Development Since 1775 (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military
Service Publishing Co., T955; and Robert Leckie, The Wars of
America
,
2 vols. (New York: Harper § Row, 1968).
1 "if:
Huntington, Soldier and State, p. 149.
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Faced with a boundless frontier and seemingly unlimited
prosperity, a philosophy of materialism emerged, combined with
optimism and a belief in superiority. These factors added
together to produce, by the end of the 19th Century, the
concept of Manifest Destiny. John Louis O'Sullivan, who coined
the term in 1845, clearly extols the intense nationalism and
optimism that fostered it:
"We have no interest in the scenes of antiquity, only as
lessons of avoidance of nearly all their examples. The
expansive future is our arena and for our history. We
are entering on its untrodden space with the truth of
God in our minds, beneficient objects in our hearts,
and with a clear conscience unsullied by the past. We
are the nation of human progress, and who will, what
can, set limits on our onward march?... The far-reaching,
the boundless future will be the era of American
greatness . "137
Believing itself to be beyond the reach of history, and seeing
Darwinian evolutionism as its true banner, America saw no
limits to its power, and no possibility of failure. In these
circumstances, why plan for the future? Far from holding any
threats, the future was in fact the panacea for the failures
of the present.
Nowhere was the combination of environment and liberalism
more evident than in the military. In fact, not until the
Civil War was the need for a separate, professional military
acknowledged. Until that time, it was assumed that any "man
John Louis O'Sullivan, "The Great Nation of Futurity,"
United States Magazine and Democratic Review , Nov. 1859.
Quoted in Henry Steele Commager, The Search for a Usable Past
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 8-9.
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of affairs" was sufficiently qualified to command and to plan
strategy. For example, though formed in 1798, it was not until
1815 that the Navy Department had assigned to it any active
duty officers. These officers were three Navy captains, and
it was they that composed the Board of Navy Commissioners.
The three captains, however, were responsible for administra-
tive matters such as procurement and design, while the Secretary,
139
a civilian dealt with questions of strategy and operations.
"The American officer of the pre-Civil War years was
frequently highly trained and scientifically educated
but his training was not in a military skill shared
with all his fellow officers and distinguishing them
from the rest of society. Instead, the officer was
expert in one of several technical specialities,
competence in which separated him from other officers
trained in different specialities and at the same time
fostered close bonds with civilians practicing his
speciality outside the military forces .... The Army
officer was frequently more engineering-minded than
military-minded, and the naval officer more seamanship-
minded than naval-minded . "140
When war came he was more often than not pushed aside, replaced
by the citizen-soldier. It was the Civil War that began the
change in this state of affairs. Abraham Lincoln was the
primary catalyst (besides the war itself) in the transformation
of the military profession. Much to his dismay, he found upon
the commencement of hostilities that:
Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy , p. 144
Huntington, Soldier and State , p. 201.
140 Ibid., p. 195.

"In no section of the staff organization was there any
person or division charged with the function of study-
ing strategy or formulating war plans for even a
theoretical war. The work of the staff was completely
technical and routine. Scott, the general in chief,
had done no thinking before the war about what strategy
should be adopted if war came." 141
Planning of strategy therefore devolved upon the President,
that is until he found Grant, By continuous prodding and
searching, and by refusing to bow to the will of the in-
competent generals that surrounded him, Lincoln thus inspired
the development of a professional military.
After the Civil War, the Army reverted to its pre-war
character, though certain officers, such as Sherman and Upton,
labored to continue laying the foundation for a more thoroughly
professional officer corps. It was not until the trauma of
the Spanish-American War of 1898 that reformers such as Elihu
Root were able to implement changes designed to instituionalize
strategic planning. Because of heavy bureaucratic resistance,
these reforms- -which subordinated the Army to the Secretary of
T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York:
Vintage paperback, 1952), p. 6. Such a lack of concern for
what should be done if hostilities break out is evident in
today's literature on strategic nuclear deterrence. For a
review of the subject, see Richard A. Brody, "Deterrence
Strategies: An Annotated Bibliography," Journal of Conflict
Resolution
,
Dec. 1960, pp. 443-457; and more recently, Donald
M. Snow, "Current Nuclear Deterrence Thinking." See also
Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy."
142Williams, Lincoln and His Generals
,
p. 14.
145Huntington, Soldier and State, pp. 230-233.
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War rather than the General in Chief and the independent bureau
chiefs, and which created the General Staff--were not completed
144
until 1912. Nevertheless, sufficient time was allowed for
the General Staff to prepare plans for war in Europe. Had
those plans and the infrastructure needed to develop them been
lacking, it is doubtful whether America could have so rapidly
deployed an army of two million men. Not only was that army
supported in the field, but so too those of our allies.
World War I was the first American war to require substan-
tial mobilization of the economy. For the first time in
American history, war plans entailed more than just what mili-
tary planners were equipped to handle. Mobilizing the economy
required planners who were familiar with industry. This neces-
sitated the use of industrialists as planners; civilians, not
military officers. Today this is an accepted fact of 20th
Century warfare, but during the First World War, it was some-
thing that the War Department neither understood nor
145
accepted. Though the development of mobilization planning
144Charles J. Hitch, "Decision Making in the Defense
Department." (Address presented at the Gaither Memorial
Lecture Series, University of California, 5-9 April, 1965),
pp. 10-11.
14 5 Paul Koistinen provides an excellent discussion of the
difficulties of mobilization and economy planning during W.W.
I. The problem was to reconcile demand with supply while
maintaining economic equilibrium. The chief culprit of the
difficulties was the War Department, whose bureaus were iitX.Lt
not under the full control of the Secretary and the General
Staff. Under these conditions, a longer war could have proven
fatal to the economy. The Military- Indus trial Complex: A




and coordination was by trial and error, and by war's end
hardly satisfactory, it provided the foundation for our
mobilization in World War II.
That war witnessed the ultimate in wars of industrial power
146
and mobilization. It was, for America, an essentially
economic war. Victory was guaranteed by the superb management
of logistics and mobilization, as well as the tactical profi-
ciency of American forces. America had finally mastered plan-
ning in these areas. Two elements remained lacking, however.
One was strategic planning, which was largely carried out by
the British. Indeed, Kent Roberts Greenfield implies that the
lack of planning on the part of the American Joint Chiefs of
Staff placed the United States at a disadvantage after the
war
:
"Both presidents consistently gave the green light to
their military chiefs, and these consistently rejected
decisions on grounds other than military effect. General
Marshall, surely was one of the most statesmanlike of
them, wrote to General Eisenhower when Mr. Churchill,
in late April, 1945, was urging the political advantages
to be gained by liberating Prague, and as much of
Czechoslovakia as possible, before the Russians
arrived on the scene: 'Personally and aside from all
the logistical, tactical or strategical implications
I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely
political purposes .' "147




Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World
War II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1963), p. 19. Quoted in Brodie, War and Politics, pp. 43-44
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As Bernard Brodie rightly argues, if not for political purpose,
which is the reason for war in the first place, then for what
reason could Marshall have justified the loss of American
148lives? This passage serves to highlight the essentially
logistical, and still technical nature of the American officer
corps in World War II.
In its field of expertise, as Huntington argues, America
was unsurpassed: "[E]conomic mobilization was a brilliant
success while the strategic government of the war left some-
thing to be desired." This in turn "...led the American people
149
to trade military security for military victory." Or, as
Hart argues of the peace:
"...the anxious state of the peoples of the free world
today is a manifestation that the directing minds failed
to think through the problem--of attaining peace through
such a [military] victory . "-*- ~>0
Not only was strategic planning lacking, but what strategy
was developed was done so more as the result of compromise
than of sound military consideration. The military lacked
the means necessary to overcome parochial interests and to










151 General David Jones, USAF (Ret.), "Why the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Must Change," Armed Forces Journal International
,
Mar. 198 2, p. 64.
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The second element that remained absent was the ability of
the nation to plan and prepare for war before it actually
begins. Our military history is one of crusades. The citizen-
soldier ethic, as a product of an internally oriented liberal-
ism, has considered war a temporary evil. Once it is over,
the soldier must return to his peaceful ways. "'Feast or
Famine' is the American way of defense preparation." Gen-
eral Jones summarizes this tendency of unpreparedness
:
"History books for the most part glorify our military
accomplishments, but a closer examination reveals a
disconcerting pattern: Unpreparedness at the onset
of each new crisis of war; Initial failures; Re-
organizing while fighting; Building our defenses as
we cranked up our industrial base; Prevailing by
wearing down the enemy- -by being bigger, not
smarter . "-*
"
The National Security Act of 1947 was designed to correct
these shortcomings. By subordinating all of the services
152Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 43.
0-5
"What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," The New
York Times Magazine
,
7 Nov., 1982, p. 41.
For a discussion of the events surrounding the military
unification battles after the war see Samuel P. Huntington,
The Soldier and the State ; and Demetrios Caraley, The Politics
of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy
Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) . A military
viewpoint that develops the theoretical underpinnings of the
conflict is contained in Maj . Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., USA,
National Security and the General Staff (Washington, D.C.:
Infantry Journal Press , 1946) . For a review of the act itself,
see Frank N. Trager, "The National Security Act of 1947," Air
University Review, Nov. -Dec., 1977, pp. 2-15. A vast
literature on defense organization has accumulated since the
end of W.W.II. The following is a select list of the more
noteworthy works: Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense:
The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century
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under the Secretary of Defense and by creating a formal Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Act was to have fostered long term strate-
gic planning, cooperation between services and consequently,
realistic pre-war planning. With the amendments of 1949, 1953,
and 1958, it succeeded, but only to a limited degree. The
success was in the sense that joint long range plans were
developed, as well as joint operating plans. Unfortunately,
those plans were largely the result of compromise, and even
then merely reinforced each service's independence. As
General Jones argues, the current system of defense planning
"...in effect represents arrangements developed in a patchwork
way during World War II."
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961) provides a
superb historical review, while Samuel P. Huntington, The
Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (Ne
w
York: Columbia University Press, 1961) gives a detailed descrip
tion of post-war planning and budgeting. For an analysis of
strategy in the 1950s, see Warner R. Schilling, et. al
.
,
Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962) . Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith
provide the inside story of the McNamara reforms, especially
the introduction of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
system in How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program,
1961-1969 (New York: Harper $ Row, 1971). More recent analyses
include Morton H. Halperin, "The President and the Military,"
Foreign Affairs
, January 1972, pp. 510-324; and considerably
broader in scope, Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor,
American National Security: Policy and Process (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). The most recent and
critical review of the defense organization is contained in
John Collins, U.S. Defense Planning .
3 Leonard Wainstein, "The Problem of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff," International Security Review , Fall 1982, p. 238.
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"Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," p. 65.
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Because of service interests and power, the joint organiza-
tions are ineffective in guiding the planning and procurement
in the military:
"The two primary functions of the joint system, military
advice and employment of forces in the field, are
compromised. Military advice, the principal function
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , is flawed by the
inability of the chiefs, also imbued with service
responsibilities, to address a broad range of conten-
tious issues as a corporate entity. The JCS acts as
a forum for arriving at conjoint service positions
through negotiations in which each service seeks to
maximize its position through bargaining at multiple
levels." 157
As is suggested in this passage, the chiefs of staff, in serv-
ing two roles, one as their own service's chief and the other
as a member of the JCS, face conflicting responsibility. The
result of this tension between parochial and joint allegiance
has in the past resulted in the major portion of their time
being spent on budgetary matters, and precious little on long
158
range planning and concept formulation.
The separation between long range planning and the budg-
etary process was one of the major reasons behind the reforms
instituted by Robert McNamara in the Defense Department in the
early 1960s. The Planning Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) , which formed the core of these reforms, sought to base
Archie D. Barrett, "Department of Defense Organization
Planning for Planning," in Planning U.S. Security , ed. Philip
S. Kronenberg, p. 65.
158 Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 95.
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weapons selection on reasoned, scientific, and economic
analysis: the biggest bang for the buck. Systems Analysis
was the primary tool used in this process. Though greatly
resented by the military, PPBS and systems analysis has on
the whole improved the procurement process. Nevertheless,
significant weaknesses have developed since the concept has
been applied. One such fault is the ability to "lie" with
statistics, which largely defeats the purpose of rigorous
quantitative analysis. Another weakness lies in the tendency
of decision makers to accept the recommendations of the systems
analysts as the decision instead of weighing them against
informed judgment and experience. A third shortcoming is that
while PPBS has gone far in solving the "in house" problems of
procurement, it has left unaddressed its major problems, such
as the contracting system. Finally, and perhaps most signif-
icant, PPBS and systems analysis, because of the focus on
economics and the budget, have failed in their initial purpose
of improving long range planning and in linking it to the
159budgetary process. Despite the revolution in budgetary
1 59Within the vast literature on the subject, the definitive
works on Systems Analysis, PPBS, and the economic approach to
defense planning include Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean,
The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Harvard University
Press , 1960 ; New York: Antheneum paperback, 1978); Alain C.
Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough ? (New York:
Harper § Row, 1971); and E.S. Quade , AnalysisTor Public
Decisions (New York: Elsevier, 1975). The definitive source on
the procurement process is J. Ronald Fox, Arming America: How
the U.S. Buys Weapons (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press , 19 74) . An excellent inside story on the reforms is
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planning, and perhaps because it was not balanced by a similar
revolution in operational planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
remain inadequate in long range planning; planning that can
direct procurement rather than reacting to it.
Perhaps the reform spirit kindled by Generals Jones and
Meyer will continue through the current set of Joint Chiefs to
produce real progress toward high quality and truly joint
strategic planning. According to General Vessey, the incoming
Chairman of the JCS, it has:
"Our first priority is war plans or military planning.
We need to be sure our military plans support our
national strategy ... .And after all, war plans are the
things that drive all other requirements- -equipment
,
people, and eventually the budget. Getting these
connected helps! "160
provided in James M. Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara:
A Study of the Role of the Secretary of Defense (Coral Gables
,
Fla . : University of Miami Press, 1970) ; and on the impact of
McNamara and PPBS on warfighting, see Gregory Palmer, The
McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War: Program Budgeting in the
Pentagon, 1960-1968 (Westport , Ct . : Greenwood Press, 1978).
For two case studies which provide an in-depth analysis of the
workings of the procurement system, see Col. Richard C. Head,
USAF, "Decision Making on the A-7 Attack Aircraft Program,"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1971); and Robert J.
Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1968). Critiques of the system and its
impact on the military abound; some of the more noteworthy
works are listed here: Douglas Kinnard, "McNamara at the
Pentagon," Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College,
Sept. 1980, pp. 22-31; Eliot Cohen, "Systems Paralysis," The
American Spectator
,
Nov. 1980, pp. 25-27; Brodie, War and
Politics
,
Chap. 10; Summers, On Strategy; and Collins, U.S.
Defense Planning .
Interview with General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman,
JCS, Armed Forces Journal International, May 1983, p. 46.
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The evolution of planning in America has been uneven,
marked by numerous setbacks, political infighting and a gen-
erally slow pace by comparison with that of the European powers
Unfortunately too, almost all periods of reform have followed
near military disasters, "near" only because of the inferiority
or distance of the enemy. That evolution is continuing today
as the reform spirit in Congress and the Pentagon suggests.
The important factor however, one that has largely been found
lacking in the evolution to date, is a general concept of
where that evolution must go. To provide a framework for that
The issue of JCS reform is once again gaining momentum,
with the House passing a moderate reform package in 1982- -the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982. As with
previous attempts to change this system, the Army and Air Force
support reorganization, while the Navy and Marine Corps (as a
whole) do not. For discussions of the bill and the testimony
surrounding it see the Armed Forces Journal International
,
June
through Sept. issues. Brian Dickson provides a more rigorous
analysis of the proposed act, in the context of previous
attempts and the history of reorganization as a whole, in "The
JCS: Impressionistic Reform," The Washington Quarterly , Winter
1983, pp. 78-85. The following is a list of the more important
and recent JCS reform literature: Lawrence J. Korb , The Joint
Chiefs of Staff ; John Charles Daly, et . al
.
, The Role of the
Joint Chiefs oT Staff in National Policy (Wash. , D .C . : American
Enterprise Institute, 1978); Gen. Edward C. Meyer, USA, "The
JCS: How Much Reform is Needed?" Armed Forces Journal
International
,
April 1982, pp. 82-90; for both sides of the
debate, see John G. Kester and James L. Holloway, III, "The
Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Better System?" American Enterprise
Institute Foreign Policy and Defense Review
,
vol. 2:1, 1980;
and finally, a plan that goes farther than most of the above
articles is proposed by Col. William G. Hanne , USA, "An Armed
Forces Staff," Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War
College
, Sept. 1982, pp. 55-62 . These works are in addition
to those previously cited by General Jones, as well as the
sizeable literature on military reform in general.
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concept, this chapter applies the ideas of the previous two
chapters to the development of a foundation for planning.
B. THE ENVIRONMENT OF PLANNING
As the chapter title states, planning is the method of
strategy. It is not itself strategy, but is merely its tool.
This distinction between strategy and planning is vague, but
if we are to understand the mechanism by which the plans that
implement strategy are developed, it must be made. Strategy
is the philosophy of doctrine and planning is its architect.
Planning takes the general framework provided by strategy and
produces doctrine. Because of the interdependence of planning
and strategy, if strategy is to be a method of thought, then
planning must be designed along such lines. The concepts by
which plans are laid must be fundamental, not dogmatic, and
they must be able to adapt to the requirements of strategy and
of the international environment.
The purpose of planning is to develop a course of action
within the framework of strategy which will, in the end,
achieve the ends dictated by policy. But, planning is a means
employed in an environment of conflict consisting of passion,
chance and policy. It operates not against an inanimate
object, but against an actively opposed will. To achieve our
aims we must carefully lay out a plan that allows for uncer-
tainty in the results of our actions, while at the same time
focusing on the elimination of the enemy's willingness to
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resist. As Beaufre so eloquently describes it, the aim of
strategy is to force a decision which
"
.
. . i& obtained by cheating and then exploiting a
6 ttuatio n n.ci>ixltlng in ALL^Xc-icnt mo<xal ditinteg nation
oh the enemy to cau.6e him to acce.pt the conditions It
4.6 dz.6X-n.cd to -impose on him."162
Planning must synthesize the framework of strategy and the
nature of the opponent.. It is against the opponent, the
intelligent actor, that the plan must succeed. His will can
be affected by the perceived costs he will incur as a result
of continued resistance combined with what he can expect as
an outcome of his surrender. In World War II, the Allied
demand for unconditional surrender played a large part in
preventing the Axis powers from seeking an end to the war
short of total destruction of their homelands. In contrast,
the Soviets considered the potential costs of continued opposi-
tion to the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis to





On prolonging the European war, see Robert Murphy,
Diplomat Among Warriors QGarden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964),
p~. 239 . The end of the Pacific War is presented in Edwin P.
Hoyt, Closing the Circle: War in the Pacific 1945
,
(New York:
Van Nostrand and Reinhold, 1982), p. 47. For a view of the
unconditional surrender requirement from the Japanese perspec-
tive, see Leonard Mosley, Hirohito Emperor of Japan (Englewood





and thus retreated. Of importance here is the need to
leave the opponent "an out":
"It is an elementary principle of strategy that, if you
find your opponent in a strong position costly to force,
you should leave him a line of retreat--as the quickest
way of loosening his resistance." 165
The task of strategic planning is to develop the path by
which the objective is to be realized and the enemy's will
broken. Consequently, the whole of strategic planning and its
product, strategic doctrine, must be animated by the under-
standing that it will operate in a dialectical environment,
against an intelligent opponent seeking to thwart our inten-
tions in favor of his own. The planner must take inputs from
various fields; intelligence, systems analysis, hardware
management, etc. From these he must make choices as to the
probable results of any actions taken, determine those courses
which will most likely allow for uncertainties, and end up
164Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign
Policy, 1917-75
,
2nd ecL (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1974), p. 674. Graham T. Allison continuously
emphasizes Kennedy's desire to give Khruschev time to back
down
. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Boston: Little, Brown $ Co., 1971), pp. 210-230. The President
is quoted as saying of Khruschev, "...give him time to consider.
I don't want to push him in a corner from which he cannot
escape." Quoted in Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir
of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton', 1969),
Hart, Strategy
,
p. 371. This reflects Sun Tzu who
wrote: "Wild beasts, when at bay, fight desperately. How
much more is this true of men! If they know there is no





with a plan that will stand a chance of success in the real
world. Possony and Pournelle, in their description of the
"strategic analyst" further refine the role of the strategic
planner
:
"The strategic analyst must trade off the demands of the
several services. He must implement the basic policies
set by the top political decision maker, and do so within
the constraints of the budget.... He must understand that
there are real uncertainties in this world in contrast
with probabilistic or statistical uncertainties which
can at least be quantified. He must understand that
since an intelligent enemy opposes him, probabilities
may not apply at all. Game theory cannot always guide
him, for some real world games can be played but once.
He must constantly strive to be the surpriser and not
the surprised . "16"
In striving to maintain the freedom of action necessary to
surprise and to keep from being surprised, the planner must not
rely solely on what possible avenues exist, but must also look
to what avenues are necessary. In this sense time enters the
analysis, time that is, to develop the necessary capabilities
to achieve an objective. This is how planning begins to plot
a course designed to shape the future to our desires, not
merely to react to the present
.
In his description of the development of a strategic plan,
Andre Beaufre provides an interesting summary of the concepts
described in the last few paragraphs. It may be argued that,
because of its generality, the process obtains as well in
long range planning as it does in war:





"We are dealing with a problem of dialectics; for every
action proposed, therefore, the possible enemy reactions
must be calculated and provision made to guard against
them. His reaction may be international or national,
psychological, political, economic or military. Each
successive action planned, together with the counter to
the corresponding enemy reaction, must be built up into
a coherent whole, the object being to retain the ability
to pursue the plan in spite of the resistance of the
enemy.... The result will be a 'risk-proof strategy,
the object of^which will be to preserve our own liberty
of action." 167
As can be seen by the preceding discussion, to plan on
contingencies is not only ill-advised, but it is also
dangerous. Without the ability to know the future, we cannot
accurately predict it. Any plan that is drawn up well in
advance will introduce a form of rigidity into the planning
process during a crisis by assuming a given set of
circumstances. While logistical plans may, to a degree, be
developed ahead of time, those dealing with operations should
not. If instead the process, people, and organization are
developed that yield swift and accurate decision making, then
planners and doctrine will be able to react to events on their
own merits, with one eye still on the distant object that is
sought. In this way, strategy and planning work to provide a
course of action in consonance with the desired ultimate ends
in a flexible and timely manner.
Such a concept of planning differs widely from that which
is prevalent in the United States today. Personnel assignment
Introduction to Strategy, p. 25.
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policies fail to produce planners who have the ability and
imagination to respond quickly and correctly to events because
of short, one-time tours. Lacking skilled planners who can
respond rapidly, the system comes to rely on contingency plans,
which tends to enhance strategic rigidity. This reliance
requires only a proficiency at their execution, rather than
an innovative and rapid approach to their formulation.
With an increasingly varied threat and with the real uncertainty
that exists in the international environment, this flexibility
169becomes essential. As Beaufre wrote in 1965:
"Dogmatisn in any form has now become impossible: there
can be no more comforting but ossifying regulations:
today we are forced to be Kzady to adapt o u.fi& alv ii>
practically instantaneously to the most varied and
perhaps least foreseeable situations." 17 ^
1 f\R
As John Collins notes: "Major U.S. defense plans
commonly take two or more years to reach completion and
approval..." U.S. Defense Plannin g, p. 197.
169 For a critique of the current system of planning, see
John Collins, U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique ; Lawrence J.
Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff ; Possony and Pournelle,
Strategy of Technology
,
specifically chap. 2; Colin Gray,
"National Style in Strategy"; Philip S. Kronenberg , Planning
U.S. Security
,
especially chapters 2 and 6; General David C.
Jones , "What ' s Wrong With Our Defense Establishment"; and
General E.C. Meyer, The JCS: How Much Reform is Needed."
For an interesting argument on the tendency of planners toward
misperception and mirror imaging, and its impact on strategy
and tactics, see Robert B. Bathurst, "On Creating an Enemy,"
U.S. Naval War College Review , Nov-Dec 1981, pp. 14-26. 'The
classic work in the area of misperception and planning is
Robert Jervis , Perception and Misperception in International
Politics (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1976).
170Deterrence and Strategy, p. 126.
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This is not to suggest that plans are no longer appropriate,
for if they were there would be little reason for this chapter.
Plans are necessary, but they must conform to the temporal
horizon they hope to affect. For example, a long term plan
should be sufficiently broad to allow for flexibility as time
passes and events occur, and should provide a framework for
the resolution of crises. On the other hand, a crisis plan
should be developed with the crisis, not before, and should
utilize the guidance of strategy, doctrine (the long term
plan), and the planner's knowledge of strategic thought and
the art and science of war to arrive quickly at a course of
171
action.
The main thrust of the argument here is that in order to
respond both correctly and swiftly to a crisis in this age of
high speed missiles and rapidly developing international events,
the planning process can no longer rely on pre-arranged plans
which, in guaranteeing timeliness, risk the surrender of
accuracy by not attuning themselves to the specific event. To
devise a plan in the abstract, separated from the actual
circumstances under which it must operate was realized as
172
absurd by Clausewitz over a century ago. " It is just as
much so today.
171 For a brief discussion on the danger inherent in
reliance on contingency plans, see Philip A. Odeen, "Organizing
for National Security," International Security , Summer 1980,
pp. 117-121.
172Rothfels, "Clausewitz," p. 106.
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The primary reason that plans must be developed only in
response to some specific policy directive requiring action
on the part of the nation lies with the uncertainty of the
future. We cannot predict the circumstances that will require
us to act, and we cannot predict the political demands that
might constrain our actions. It is of value to have plans
that, rather than defining the response to make, merely ensure
that the mechanisms exist by which that response may be
developed. Such plans, as mentioned above, might ensure a
list of options to the crisis planners in terms of logistics
and forces available. It would nevertheless be up to them to
decide both the quantity and the nature of the employment of
forces, subject, of course, to the demands and control of
policy.
The final aspect of the environment of planning is the
.nature of the means which will best yield favorable results
when applied. This nature can take on two faces, direct or
indirect. Such a concept was articulated by Liddell Hart
who applied it to the operational level of war, and especially
1 mm mm
armor tactics. J The most recent extension of his arguments
may be found in the debate over "attrition" style warfare
versus "maneuver" style; the latter more closely approaching
Hart ' s .




Both the earlier thesis of Hart's and the more recent
writings on "maneuver" warfare are limited in the sense that
they deal more with tactics than strategy. If these concepts
are taken and applied at the level of strategy, some truly
revealing results are observed. This is exactly what Beaufre
achieved with Introduction to St-ia.te.gy. He describes two
types of strategy, direct and indirect. The two are not
mutually exclusive, but rather, are interdependent. For
example, if some set of circumstances prohibits the use of
174The literature on this subject is rapidly growing.
Maneuver warfare has become one of the few agreed upon points
of the Military Reform Caucus, and has as its proponents such
defense specialists as Jeffrey Record, Edward Luttwak and
William Lind. For a brief discussion of the Reform Caucus, its
purposes, its conceptual foundation, and its problems, see
Jeffrey Record, "The Military Reform Caucus," The Washington
Quarterly
,
Spring 1983, pp. 125-129. For thorough discussions
of the maneuver warfare concept, see the following: William S.
Lind, "Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps," Marine
Corps Gazette
,
March 1980, pp. 55-58; Edward Luttwak, "The
American Style of Warfare"; and "The Operational Level of War";
Jeffrey Record, The Rapid Deployment Force (Wash., D.C.:
Corporate Press, 1981}; William Lind, "Why the German Example?"
Marine Corps Gazette
,
June 82, pp. 59-65; and Record, "The
Falklands War," The "Washington Quarterly
,
Autumn 1982, pp.
43-51. As cited previously, Jeffrey McKitrick ("A Military
Look at Military Reform," Comparative Strategy , 4:1, 1983)
and Lt . Col. W. Kross ("Military Reform: Past and Present,"
Air University Review
,
Jul -Aug, 81) provide counter arguments
to the maneuver warfare school. Perhaps the most lucid
argument against pure maneuver warfare, though one tied
specifically to Central Europe, is provided by Col. Trevor N.
Dupuy, USA (Ret.), "The Nondebate Over How Army Should Fight,"
Army
,
Jun. 1982, pp. 35-45. In this article, Dupuy puts
forth a very persuasive argument for a defense in depth, based
partly on maneuver warfare concepts, but largely on history.
For a description of the Army's efforts to reform its fighting
doctrine, see Deborah Shapley, "The Army's New Fighting
Doctrine," The New York Times Magazine, Nov. 28, 1982.
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direct strategy, indirect strategy will have free play. If
on the other hand, direct strategy is relatively unhindered,
indirect strategy will be less decisive. An understanding of
this is essential to the planner because he must choose the
proper strategy for the given situation or even the best of
plans is doomed to failure.
Direct strategy is defined by Beaufre as that form of
strategy in which
"...military force is the principal weapon and that
victory or deterrence will be achieved by its use
or maintenance . "1 '
5
It is the strategy of total war, to use Clausewitz's term.
Because the open clash of military force is the result, the
most important field is the military, and all others are
subordinated to it.
In direct strategy, any freedom of action, which is always
the key to success in the game of strategy, will be found in
the theater of operation. In other words, the enemy must be
forced to acquiesce, either as the result of defeat in battle,
or of surrender for fear of defeat in battle. In this type of
strategy, the concepts of Liddell Hart and "maneuver" warfare
can be useful, and, if your force is the weaker, essential.
Because direct strategy is that which emphasizes primarily
the use of military force, it places a greater reliance on
17 5 Introduction to Strategy, p. 43
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material factors than does indirect strategy. In essence, to
play the game of detect strategy and win, one must have
sufficient muscle, no matter how brilliant the tactical moves.
This brings out an important point, and one which must be
understood. Direct and indirect Atia.te.gy may both use direct
and/or indirect tacttcA , or any combination of the two. The
important distinction lies in the fact that direct strategy
emphasizes the use of military force, so military means will
dominate; while indirect strategy stresses the use of various
forces, such as diplomatic or economic, and it is their means
which will dominate. The planner must choose the means which
are appropriate, he must not, for example, choose direct
strategv means in an indirect strategv situation.
Indirect strategy, in contrast with direct strategy, is
defined by Beaufre as that strategy which is used when
decisions are to be sought by other than purely military
means. He goes on to illustrate this definition:
"These may be political or economic in nature (e.g. a
revolutionary war) or they may use military force but
proceed in a series of bounds interspersed with political
negotiations (e.g. Hitler's strategy from 1936 to
1939) ."176
The most recent uses of this form of strategy have been the
wars of de-colonialization and "liberation." It was also used
extensively in another time, when the actual use of an army
Introduction to Strategy, p. 44
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was prohibitively expensive, but its existence provided the
deterrent umbrella for lesser forms of conflict. The period
referred to here is the 18th Century. Its style of warfare
was destroyed by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic
Wars
.
Because it relies on other than military means, indirect
strategy can only be effective if those military means are
somehow cancelled out. The most obvious example of this is
the way in which nuclear deterrence (a direct strategy) inhibits
the superpower's use of military means to resolve confrontations
With the swiftest and most decisive of the giants' power thus
muzzled, other forms become more decisive; forms such as
psychological or political warfare. Thus, while the nuclear
umbrella tends to eliminate total war, it also eliminates
total peace because indirect strategy has greater freedom of
action
.
Of more practical importance to the planner however, is
the implication that in this era of nuclear deterrence, one
must be prepared to oppose indirect strategy with indirect
strategy. The major difference here is that the freedom of
action to pursue one's objectives is gained outside the
theater of operations rather than within it , as in direct
«. * 178strategy.
For a contemporaneous discussion of this revolution in
warfare, see Clausewitz, On War , Viri : 5 : 588 - 592
.
17 8





It thus becomes clear that when facing an opponent who is
able to use an indirect strategy, such as North Vietnam, the
strategy chosen must not consider the theater of operations
in isolation from the rest of the world. It is in the wider
environment that the decisive battle must be fought, the
battle for world opinion and for the support of the people.
Under these circumstances, a purely military solution is
impossible. Instead all forms of power must be brought to
bear, and all possible avenues of exploitation must be closed
17 9
to the enemy.
The final implication of this era of indirect strategy
is that much more emphasis must be placed on the moral aspect
of war, since more often than not, the outcome of a conflict
is to be decided by psychological rather than physical means.
A corollary to this is that the greater role of the moral fac
tors increases the uncertain nature of any conflict; for who
can predict when a people will loose the will to resist?
This, in turn, goes back to the idea of a flexible and
1 "9 Beaufre is not the first to develop this idea of
indirect strategy, it has a long history in French strategy.
A significant portion of his theory, especially that part
which expounds the use of other than military force, may
be found in the writings of the great French colonial
warriors, Bugeaud (1840), and Gallieni and his student
Lyautey (1900). For a concise, yet thorough discussion of
these three men and their theories, see Jean Gottman,
"Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautev. The Development of French




responsive planning process that relies not on contingency
plans and dogma, but on the ability of its planners to see
through the events of the present, and to formulate operational
plans to suit the circumstances. In short the process must





V. THE PLANNING PROCESS
"Everything in vjolk is very simple, but the simplest
thing is di^icult. The difficulties accumulate,
and end by producing a kind o& fiction that is
inconceivable. unless one. has experienced war....
The. good ge.ne.nal must know fiction in order to
overcome it whe.ne.ve.ri possible-, and in oKde.fi not
to expect a standard o & achievement in his
operations which this very fiction makes
impossible. "
1 &Carl von Clausewitz
In this chapter the same topic of strategic planning is
continued, but moves from a theoretical to an institutional
context. The general environment and historical context
developed in the previous chapter is applied to the actual
planning process. The first point in the discussion of this
planning process is the idea of the levels of planning, which
correspond to the levels of strategy addressed in Chapter 3.
The next section will then deal with the guidelines which
serve as aids in planning, guidelines that, as will be dis-
cussed in detail, derive their meaning from the fundamental
environment of international relations. The analysis then
turns to a brief discussion of the general characteristics




the chapter closes with a brief description of the nature of
1 O "I
the plans developed by each level.
A. THE LEVELS OF PLANNING
The environment within which planning must operate has
been described, and it is seen as merely an extension of the
environment of strategy: the international environment. But,
just as was done with strategy in Chapter III, the discussion
has treated planning as a whole, when in fact is made up of
many separate parts and levels. This section addresses these
levels and parts. For ease of analysis, planning is broken
down into three levels: national, overall and operational.
The reader will note that these levels correspond to the
levels of strategy discussed above.
The purpose of national strategic planning is to coordinate
the various fields of government into a single unified doc-
trine in pursuit of the ends set by policy. It must develop
those plans which allocate the resources of a nation in the
most efficient and effective manner among the fields. But,
this forms only part of the role of national strategic
planning. It must also provide guidance to the fields,
181
One should bear in mind that what is under considera-
tion in this chapter is the process of planning, not the
organization which must support that process. Because it ad-
dresses no single organization, the chapter is of a general
enough nature to be applicable to all levels of planning which
deal with international relations.
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setting goals for them to play by and defining the degree and
nature of cooperation between the fields.
So that the apparatus of national strategic planning
should not become overloaded by the immensity of its task, it
should take a broad, long term perspective. It should state
the purposes of the nation in general terms which can be used
as guidance by the fields. National strategic planning should
provide the direction for the nation as a whole, and should
not concern itself with how that direction is realized except
in an oversight function.
In the United States, the function of national strategic
planning is not to be found in one organization of the
government. Part of the planning is nominally done by the
National Security Council (NSC), which is tasked "...to
integrate all aspects of national policy relating to security
18 2
affairs." u But the NSC is the tool of the president, and
tends to take on the nature he assigns it. Thus, under Truman,
it was little used, while under Eisenhower, the former general,
it knew a formal structure that yielded some noteworthy
products. Kennedy preferred a more ad hoc advisory system,
and hence had his Executive Committee of the NSC. Carter
initially used a very formal structure, similar to that used
John E. Endicott, "The National Security Council," in
American Defense Policy , 5th ed . Ed. John F. Reichart and






by Nixon and Kissinger, but eventually came to rely on more
informal means, such as luncheons.
Even if the NSC could be made to function in a consistent
manner, it lacks the authority necessary to be an overall
national security planning staff. The sources of this dilem-
ma are two. First, within the executive branch, the "chain
of command" for planning is not clearly articulated. Seldom
has there been a time when the State Department bowed to the
will of the NSC. The animosity between Carter's Secretary of
State, Cyrus Vance, and his National Security Advisor,
184Zbigniew Rrezezinski, serves as a prime example. Measures
to alleviate this situation would most likely require signif-
icant reorganization of the executive branch. One solution,
less drastic and thus more possible than reorganization is
suggested by Philip Odeen. He argues for the establishment of a
1 O 7
For a discussion of the NSC under the first three presi-
dents mentioned above, see Stanley Falk, "The National Security
Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," Polit ical
Science Quarterly
,
Sept. 1964, pp. 403-434. A discussion of
the Carter NSC Is" contained in Lawrence J. Korb, "National
Security Organization and Process in the Carter Administration,"
in Defense Politics and the Presidency: Carter's Frost Years
,
ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979).
General discussions of the subject are contained in I.M.
Destler, "National Security Advise to U.S. Presidents: Some
Lessons from Thirty Years," World Politics
,
Jan. 1977, pp.
143-175; and Philip Odeen, "Organizing for National Security."
See also John Collins, U.S. Defense Planning and Jordan and
Taylor, American National Security: Policy and Process .
James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States
Foreign Policy and World Order , 2nd ed . (Boston: Little, Brown




"Department of State-headed interagency contingency
planning committee .... Such a committee could make
substantial contributions to the consistency,
thoroughness, and effectiveness of planning in
anticipation of crises. "185
The second source of the national strategic planning dilem-
ma lies in the nature of the American form of government. In
their desire to develop internal checks to the usurpation of
political power, the framers of the Constitution dispersed
that power within the government. As a result of this dis-
persal, Congress received "...a breathtaking array of
powers." It was assumed that these protective devices
would allow the government to proceed about its business con-
cerned with the national good, not that of individual pressure
groups. It was to be a republic; at once both democratic and
18 7
representative, national and federal.
By the end of the 19th Century, it became apparent that
the system was no longer functioning as it had been designed.
Large business interests had undue influence on the electorally
18 8
chosen Senate, and massive social inequities had developed.
Since that time, over successive administrations, the national
element has gained strength over the federal, and the
1 8 5
"Organizing for National Security," p. 127.
"[Of.
Davidson and Oleszek, Congress and Its Members , p. 22
187
James Madison, Federalist Papers 39, p. 246.




democratic over the representative. Congress is the body
that most clearly reflects these changes.
Because of the increasing work load of big federal govern-
ment, Congress has been forced to divide its labor among
committees. While these committees have allowed it to per-
form its representative role by ensuring that the mass of
issues Congress must now decide upon get a hearing, they have,
by the same token, lessened its ability to coordinate policy:
"To be sure, committees enable Congress to address a
growing array of complex, interrelated issues and
process its crushing workload. Yet outmoded and
proliferating committees inhibit Congress's abilitv
to advance comprehensive responses to problems . "189
The detrimental effect of the committee system is thus the
elimination of a detached, body of legislators who can see the
"big picture" and direct the law-making process to the benefit
of the nation as a whole.
The failure to have a coordinating function in Congress is
a direct result of the committee system. Each committee must
guard its own power base if it is to be effective. This leads
to compromises and stalemates, which in turn make Congress
more susceptible to private interest groups. The overall
effect is a Congress more at the mercy of constituents than
in the service of the nation. Richard Haass highlights the
impact of this on American foreign relations:
18 9
Davidson and Oleszek, Congress and Its Members, p. 227
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"Indeed, it is impossible to avoid wondering (and
worrying) about the compatibility of the new
Congress, with its decentralization of authority,
its vulnerability to special interests and its
tendency to legislate severe but separate norms,
with the demands of a world-order policy that could
satisfy allies and contain adversaries." 190
The legislative power then comes to rest with the people,
who cannot see beyond their own limited interests. In effect,
the system of internal checks is transformed into a system of
external checks, with the prospect of an increasing paralysis
of the government.
The most significant power granted Congress by the Founding
Fathers was control over the raising and spending of money.
190
"Congressional Power: Implications for American Security
Policy," in Adelphi Papers 155
, Summer 1979, p. 55.
191 The literature covering the government, its organization,
actions, and deficiencies is surpassed in size only by the
government itself. On Congress see Davidson and Oleszek,
Congress and Its Members ; Richard Haass, "Congressional Power,"
Adelphi Papers 155, Summer 1979, pp. 1-59; and R.L. Bledsoe
and R. Handberg, "Changing Times: Congress and Defense,"
Armed Forces and Society
, Spring 1980, pp. 415-429. On the
budgetary interface between Congress and the Executive, see
Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense ; Dennis S. Ippolito,
The Budget and National Politics (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman,
1978) ; and Arnold Kanter, Defense Politics: A Budgetary
Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). On
the Presidency itself, see Henry Kissinger, White House Years ;
Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign
Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder
,
Colo . : Westview Press, 1980) ; and Larry Berman, The" Office of
Management and Budget and the Presidency, 1921-1979 (Princeton
,
N.JL: Princeton University Press, 1979) . For a study of the
nature of the bureaucracy see Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic
Politics and Foreign Policy (Wash., D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 19 74); I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and
Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform
(Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Pres , 1974) ; and
specifically a critique of the State Department, Smith
Simpson, The Crisis in American Diplomacy .
112

This factor, combined with the increase in the size of Con-
gressional staffs--a result of the reforms of the 1970s--has
enabled Congress to formulate its own strategy, or at least
to seriously question that of the Executive. The result
of this duality of strategic planning, while enhancing the
representative nature of our government has effectively
eliminated a national strategy. Lower levels first of all
lack specific guidance in their planning. More importantly,
however, these same lower levels can play Congress and the
NSC against one another to gain their own ends. This is
clearly detrimental to the development of a coherent national
strategy.
Unable to prioritize, plagued with "lowest common
denominator" solutions, and vulnerable to the machinations
of bureaucratic politics, it becomes near impossible for the
government to produce a coherent and long range national
strategy. While specific recommendations are not offered
here, serious study should be undertaken in this field.
Samuel Huntington cautions that these shortcomings are part
of the price "...the American people will have to pay for
193
the other benefits of their constitutional system."
Nevertheless, it would appear that some changes could be made
1 Q n
x Davidson and Oleszek, Congress and Its Members , p. 5ll
Soldier and State, p. 192.
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within the framework of the Constitution that would improve
the efficiency of the planning function. Haass, for example,
reviews the various types of reforms that are practical, but
concludes that the main problem lies with the ability of the
Legislative and Executive branches to work together. Alle-
viating this situation is the only realistic solution he
sees, and suggests that the key is a strong President and a
1Q4
united administration. "
The failure of planning at the national level is serious,
for it gives rise to the first major break in the link
between values and hardware. If America is to proceed in an
efficient and effective manner into the future, these prob-
lems must be corrected.
National strategic planning, in theory at least, is
responsible for translating national policy into a coordinated
effort by the fields of government. It takes into account
the goals of that policy and the conditions presented by the
international environment in the development of plans of
action. It has also been argued, however, that in the United
States, both the planning and decisionmaking functions at
this level are fractured, preventing coherent long range and
crisis planning. This pattern, as will be seen in the next
chapter, repeats itself at the overall level, especially in
the military field.
194
Haass, "Congressional Power," pp. 29-34.
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Planning at the overall level has two main purposes.
First, it seeks to coordinate the efforts of the branches
within the field toward the achievement of the goal set by
the national strategic doctrine. The second major purpose
of overall strategic planning is to communicate with the
other fields in government in order to coordinate efforts as
set forth by the national strategic doctrine.
Because overall strategic planning has a narrower per-
spective, being concerned with only one field rather than
the government as a whole, its time horizon should also be
narrower. With a shorter time horizon, overall planning
must place a greater emphasis on the current and mid-term
international environment, and must have the capability to
react even more rapidly to crises. In the same sense, though,
overall strategy is in a position to pay greater attention to
detail. Thus, the effect of a reduced scope is more than
offset by the need for increased speed and attention to
detail
.
The final level of planning is the operational level.
Its purpose is:
"...not only to harmonize the objectives laid down by
overall strategy with the capabilities of the tactics
and techniques in use in the branch concerned, but
also to ensure that those tactics and techniques are
developed in the directions which will best fit them
to meet future strategic requirements . "195





The consequences of a breakdown in the strategic planning
process at any one of these levels now becomes apparent. If
the plans and goals are not developed in a sufficiently
rigorous manner at each and every level, those levels below
are cut loose from the reins of policy. Lacking the neces-
sary direction from above, each must interpret its own role
in achieving the objects of policy, each must develop its
own criteria for the measure of success, and each operates
independently of the others. The higher the level at which
the break occurs, the more costly the consequences.
Thus, the failure of strategic planning results in a
breakdown in the coordinated efforts of the government,
initiating an exponential growth in the cost of meeting
obj ectives
.
"Without strategy, there is no mechanism for integrat-
ing goals, tasks, and priorities, and there is rio
criterion for the weighing of risks and costs."-'-""
In short, the various organs of government are incapable of
prioritizing, and must therefore seek the maximum resources
attainable
.
B. THE GUIDELINES OF PLANNING
Traditionally, the guidelines used by strategists have
been called "principles." But such a label carries with it
a connotation of rigidity, of cookbook rules, and of dogma.
Possony and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology , p. 51
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Too often in the past blind adherence to "principles" of
strategy has led to defeat and useless slaughter. Keeping in
mind that each plan must be developed out of the specific
circumstances which obtain, and that the role of theory is to
provide a framework for analysis, not a checklist, the term
"principles" of strategy is clearly inappropriate.
Clausewitz tells us that the purpose of strategic theory
is to
"...shed light on the components of war and their
interrelationships, stressing those few principles
or rules that can be demonstrated." 19 '
Those "few principles" were described in the chapter on the
environment of strategy: that strategy is subordinated to
politics, and that the environment within which these are
played out is made up of passion, chance and policy.
What, then is the purpose of strategic "guidelines," and
how do they differ from the use of strategic "principles?"
First of all, the guidelines do not differ in substance from
the principles, it is merely a desire to emphasize flexibility
in planning that has led to a change in the designation.
Secondly, one purpose of the guidelines is to aid in organiz-
ing thought and prioritizing events; they act as a structured
framework to guide the planner's thought. A second purpose
is to provide planners with the criteria necessary to analyze
197 Clausewitz, On War, 111:1:177.
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present plans and past uses of strategy. In other words,
they ensure
"...that one need not start afresh each time sorting
out the material and plowing through it, but will
find it readv to hand and in good order."^°
Thus, the strategic guidelines provide the tools for analyz-
ing the past and learning from it, for understanding the
present, and for plotting a course into the future.
A final reason the guidelines have been named as such, is
that principles, being more or less 'the law', are perceived
as originating from some great writer or general, and are
thus susceptible to obsolescence. On the other hand, the
impression that is sought here is that these concepts derive
their substance from the very nature of conflict, from chance,
passion, and rational policy making, and hence are independ-
ent of time. As the discussion proceeds, keep in mind their
origin. It will clarify what will undoubtedly be brief and
less than optimum definitions and will underscore the inter-
dependent nature of the guidelines. Each one is not so much
defined as described, the intent being to operational ize the
concepts, and to make the reader familiar with their usage
in as brief a space as possible.
The guidelines have both a tactical and a strategic




"For the strategist, the principles of war provide a
set of military planning interrogatives- -a set of
questions that should be considered if military
strategy is to best serve the national interest.
For the tactician, these principles provide an
operational framework for the military actions he
has been trained to carry out. They are neither
intended nor designed to be prescriptive; the
principles of war, if understood and applied
properly, should stimulate thought and enhance
flexibility of action." 199
The following discussion will largely ignore the tactical
level, but it will still seek to "stimulate thought."
The Object : This guideline has been described above, and
refers to the goal a plan is to achieve. Explicit definition
of the object is absolutely essential in every level of
planning, for it guides the entire process and provides the
necessary foundation for the next level in the hierarchy.
"If we don't know where we are going, it is impossible to
determine when we get there." This guideline has delib-
erately been labeled the "object" rather than the "objective."
The purpose in this distinction is found in Liddell Hart's
Stn.at2.gy:
"The term 'objective', although common usage, is not
really a good one. It has physical and geographical
sense- -and thus tends to confuse thought. It would
be better to speak of the 'object' when dealing with
purpose of policy, and of 'the. mi.lltah.ij aim' when
199 Chapter 3, Field Manual 10Q-1, The Army , 14 Aug., 1 981
Chapter 3 forms the Appendix to Summers On Strategy , and it
was from that source that this quote was taken, pp. 196-197.
200 Summers, On Strategy, p. 186.
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dealing with the way that forces are directed in the
service of policy . "201
When considering the strategic aspect of this guideline, the
distinction becomes important because of the more general
nature of the term 'object'.
Freedom of Action/ Initiative :
"The essence of strategy, in fact, is the struggle for
freedom of action. The basis of the game of strategy,
therefore, is the preservation of one's own freedom




Freedom of action is essential if plans are to be successfully
implemented, and in order to reduce the ability of the enemy
to counter our moves in unexpected ways. The object is to
force him to alter his plans, while ours remain intact.
Flexibil ity : This refers to the ability of a plan to
adapt to the rapidly changing tide of events, and of its
ability to maintain the initiative under changing conditions.
Liddell Hart sums up the importance of flexibility:
"To be practical, any plan must take account of the
enemy's power to frustrate it; the best chance of
overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that
can be easily varied to fit the circumstances met;
to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the
initiative, the best way is to operate along a line
which offers alternative objectives." 200












In this era, two of the more significant elements of
6tn.a.tzqi.c flexibility are strategic mobility and readiness.
In the form of a general recommendation, Richard Betts writes:
"U.S. programs should sacrifice some incremental addi-
tions of combat striking power to an emphasis on strate-
gic lift, in-theater mobility, better maintenance for
higher readiness, and tactical flexibility. 204
Economy of Force : This refers to the judicious use of
the resources at hand, and as with the other guidelines, per-
tains to the entire realm of strategy and policy. It is not
to mean the withholding of forces, but on the contrary it is
"...always to make sure that all forces are involved- -always
205
to ensure that no part of the whole force is idle." In
other words, do not fritter away your resources needlessly,
be efficient.
Maneuver : Maneuver is designed to throw the opponent off
balance, even if momentarily, for the purpose of seizing the
initiative or of making a bold advance. It can exist in two
planes, the physical and the psychological. To operate
successfully, the maneuver must take the physical " l-lnz o fa
lo.a.6t fit-iibtcLYicz," and the psychological " IZm o fa l&cu>t
ZxpzctCLtZon." The purpose of this 'distraction' is to dzp/iivz




205Clausewitz, On War, 111:14:213.
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9 n f\both the physical and psychological spheres." At the level
of national strategy, maneuver is now done with industry and
technology, as well as diplomacy and military force."
Concentration : Again, this concept refers to more than
just the numerical concentration of forces. It also addresses
the concentration of effort and of resources in general
.
Liddell Hart gives perhaps the most lucid statement of con-
centration, one which also highlights the dialectical nature
of war:
"...war is a two-party affair, so imposing the need that
while hitting one must guard. Its corollary is that,
in order to hit with effect, the enemy must be taken
off his guard. Effective concentration can only be
obtained when the opposing forces are dispersed; and,
usually, in order to ensure this, one's own forces
must be widely distributed. Thus, by an outward para-
?fi(
,
dox, true concentration is the product of dispersion.""
In other words, by forcing your opponent to spread his forces
to cover multiple areas of threat, you are faced with less
opposition at the po*int of your choosing. Concentration is
relative, not absolute.
Unity of Command : That this guideline is pertinent should
by now be beyond doubt. How else is there to be a firm
definition of objective? How else are the interests of the





Beaufre suggests this in Introduction to Strategy , p.
100. It in turn forms the foundation for Possony and Pournelle
The Strategy of Technology , who draw heavily upon the French
strategist
.
208 Strategy, p. 343
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of the field to the nation? "Unity of command obtains unity
of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a
209
common goal." Jeffrey Record provides another clear
definition of unity of command, a definition that pertains
to more than just the limited case he is discussing, the
Rapid Deployment Force:
"A successful combined operation requires a single
centralized command possessing unchallenged authority
over pre-operation planning and forces earmarked for
the operation, as well as authority over the execution
of the operation itself. "210
Simplicity :
"Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does
not mean that everything is very easy.... It is easy
to chart a course. But great strength of character,
as well as great lucidity and firmness of mind, is
required in order to follow through steadily, to carry
out the plan and not to be thrown off course by
thousands of diversions . "211
With that introduction, keeping plans, techniques and hardware
as simple as possible seems appropriate. If chance in war
will thwart even the simplest plan, consider what it will do
to the complex one. Regarding the disastrous failure of the
Iranian hostage rescue attempt:




21QThe Rapid Deployment Force (The Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, Washington, D.C.: Corporate Press, 1981),
pp. 66-67.
211 Clausewitz, On War, 111:1:178.
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"It may well have been the most complex amphibious
raid in military history .... .The principle of simplicity
was obviously violated . "212
Simplicity is ignored at great risk to the success of a plan.
Morale : In war morale is the decisive factor: "Naturally
moral strength must not be excluded, for psychological forces
exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war."
In an era of indirect strategy and long term defense, the
moral factors take on an even larger role. With the limita-
tions on the use of force, the importance of psychological
warfare grows. We must protect our psychological flank from
attack by enemy propaganda, and we must maintain the morale
of our people from the protracted conflict: long term
defense. By the same token, morale must not be overplayed
214
as it was by such French strategists as DuPicq and Foch."
High morale can accomplish amazing feats, but without good
equipment, it is useless.
Security : This refers to the ability to ensure the
safety of one's forces. One way to security is the secrecy
of plans, but this can only be carried so far; those in the
field must know what they are to do. A better way to security
is to maintain the initiative. Then, the enemy is too busy
212
Maj . Robert L. Earl, USMC, "A Matter of Principle,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Feb. 83, p. 34.
213 Clausewitz, On War , 11:1:127.
214 See Stefan T. Possony and Etienne Mantoux, "Du Picq
and Foch: The French School," in Makers of Modern Strategy ,
ed. E.M. Earle, pp. 206-233.
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reacting to your moves to be able to attack from an
unexpected direction.
Surprise : This, according to Clausewitz, is a much
overrated concept. While he argues that surprise "...lies at
the root of all operations without exception," he cautions
against building your plans around it. "The principle is
highly attractive in theory, but in practice, it is often
held up by the friction of the whole machine."" Summers
agrees with Clausewitz by arguing that strategic surprise
is a rarity. In a strict military sense, this is so.
Nevertheless, knowledge of an impending attack, especially
at the opening of hostilities, is not the equivalent of taking
action to absorb that attack. In other words, surprise is
more often the result of a failure of will on the part of a
~>l 7government than of a failure of intelligence."
In the context of NATO doctrine in general and American
in particular, surprise is a crucial element. The West can
expect to be surprised (politically if not militarily), and
as such should design its plans, tactics, and forces around
this. In support of this, Betts argues that the means to
overcoming political surprise is possession of "...the capacity
to cope with unanticipated tactics and doctrinal surprise."





Betts, Surprise Attack, p. 4
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Such a capability is found only in a "...military bureaucracy
and strategic community capable of sensitivity, creativity,
218
and quickly adaptive innovation." Again, strategy must
be a method of thought.
One other hedge against surprise lies in a flexibility of
the size of forces available. What is needed is a significant
"surge" capability which allows rapid response to an attack,
while, in periods of lesser tension, obviates the economic
strain that large standing forces create. Such concepts have
been tried in the past, some have failed, some have not.
With sufficient study, a satisfactory means could be found
to implement this, especially in Europe,"
Speed : Speed is an ingredient of success for many of
the concepts that have been described above. It improves
one's chances for freedom of action, aids in economy of force,
is the secret to successful concentration, and is a key
element of surprise. Speed needs to be taken into considera-
tion at all levels of planning, for the quicker you act, the
less time the element of chance has to ruin your plan, and
the less time your opponent has to react. But, a word of




219 Such a concept is supported by Betts, Surprise Attack ,
p. 297; Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy , p. 130 ; Edward N.
Luttwak, "On the Meaning of Victory," The Washington Quarterly ,
Autumn 1982, p. 23; and Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of
War," p. 2 50.
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you would desire to go slowly. Perhaps a better term for
speed would be tZme.l4.ne.66
.
These then are the strategic guidelines. They are useful
to the strategist as guides in the planning process, and to
the student as aids in the analytical/learning process. The
investigation into strategy now turns to the strategist and
the organization which allows him to function.
C. THE PLANNERS
By now it is apparent that planners must be developed who
can utilize the flexible process that has been set forth. In
this section, a general discussion of their qualities will be
undertaken so as to provide a rough idea of the changes that
will be required. As preview to those qualities that are
necessary of a planner, Beaufre provides an interesting
analogy:
"The strategist is like a surgeon called upon to operate
upon a sick person who is growing continuously and with
extreme rapidity and of whose detailed anatomy he is
not sure; his operating- table is in a state of perpetual
motion and he must -have ordered the instruments he is
to use five years beforehand . "-^
Possony and Pournelle define the military strategist's
role as one of synthesizing the conflicting information from
politicians, engineers, scientists, systems analysts and
military commanders into a cohesive whole that provides the
optimum equipment for a reasonable price that will be





effective in combat. To accomplish such a task, which is
"...almost beyond human talents..." requires that the planner
"...have courage; that is, moral courage, the courage
to make decisions that may be adverse to his career.
He must be willing to give unpopular advice. He must
have the courage to say 'no,' emphatically ... .He must
also have the courage to understand that he may be
wrong, and to make the appropriate investment of
resources in a hedge against this contingency . "221
They go on to add that the planner must also know the art of
war, indeed if he is to have a specialty, let it be that.
Finally, the planner must understand the needs of the
operators, and he must be familiar with technology. In short,
the planner must be a renaissance man, specializing in no
field, but knowledgeable in many.
America, like the Roman Empire, must seek ways to
"...provide security for the civilization without prejudicing
the vitality of its economic base and without compromising
222the stability of an evolving political order."" " To do so
in this era requires strategists trained as such. The sug-
gestion of a dedicated group of planners in the military,
perhaps under the control of, and rewarded by, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, whose "stated intent [is] to institutional
-
? 23ize strategic excellence," appears to offer promise.""
7 21 Strategy of Technology
, pp. 88-89. Indeed, Huntington
argues that the task is "beyond human talents": it has become
"...impossible to be an expert in the management of violence
for external defense and at the same time to be skilled in













In any case they must be fully indoctrinated into the
"traditions of civility in which the good society,
the liberal, democratic wav of life at its best',
originated and developed . "224
The current U.S, military procedure of assigning whoever
is available as planners, and then for only a short tenure,
is absurd in light of the concepts expounded above. However,
the purpose of such planners, at the overall level especially,
is not to direct the planning of the branches and develop
original plans, but to safeguard the interests of their parent
22 5branch. The result is a reluctance to change, because
such change might negatively impact on the branch. Concern
for bureaucratic power also reduces the ability to innovate.
This defect was noted as far back as the late 1950 's by
Samuel Huntington, among others:
"...more than anything else, one is struck by the
tendency of the military to embrace the broad policy
AtatuA quo." 22 &
Furthermore, Collins argues, that similar shortcomings exist
2 ?7in the NSC, State Department and OSD.




Col. William G. Hanne , USA, "An Armed Forces Staff,"
Paramaters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College
,
Sept. 1982
p. 55. See also Korb , The Joint Chiefs of Staff
, pp. 21-25.
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227 See Defense Planning , Part III.
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Planners should cycle between staffs and field. In this
way they gain experience as planners which sharpens their
skills, while at the same time remaining in contact with the
forces their plans will control. The separation of the
French general staff from the main part of the army in 1833
demonstrates the danger of a cloistered elite. By the
1870 war against the Prussians, which ended in total defeat
of France, this inbreeding yielded a staff system whose selec-
tion criteria was based on "...purely practical abilities
like horsemanship .. .while learning and a knowledge of military
theory had been ignored.""
Concomitant with this rotation, their tours should be
longer than the two to three years common in the American
military today. The planner must develop fully the skills
of the job he is currently in, and must see the results of
his actions. The current assignment practices in the American
230
military, for example, prevent this growth.
The role that a planner must play in the security of his
country, whether he is a military planner or diplomatic or
economic, is a heavy responsibility. To meet the challenge,
Brig. Gen. James D. Hittle, USA (Ret.), The Military






2 29 Possony and Mantoux, "Du Picq and Foch: The French
School," p. 217.




his training must be rigorous and never ending. He must have
a firm base in history and the culture of his people; to a
degree he must even be a philosopher. As Clausewitz so
succinctly states, because strategy is simple does not mean
that it is easy:
"It sounds odd, but everyone who is familiar with this
aspect of warfare will agree that it takes more strength
of will to make an important decision in strategy than
in tactics. In strategy ... there is ample room for
apprehensions, one's own and these of others; for
objections and remonstrations and, in consequence, for
premature regrets."---
A planner not sufficiently grounded in the basics of history,
culture, and strategy, will have little chance when put to
the test. History provides perspectives; culture and philos-
ophy develop purpose; and knowledge of the art of war yields
conviction.
"The test of our future leaders' merit may well not
lie in perseverance when the light at the end of the
tunnel is expected but rather in their persistence
and continued performance of duty when there is no
possibility that the light will ever show up."- J -
It is under these circumstances that the planner and the
leader must function. To do so he must know his business.
But, even then, the special qualities of what Clausewitz
calls "military genius" will also be necessary:
"If we then ask what sort of mind is likeliest to
display the qualities of military genius, experience
and observation will both tell us that it is the
inquiring rather than the creative mind, the
"Clausewitz, On .Car , 111:1:178.
-> - ->
Stockdale, "Educating Leaders," p. 52
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comprehensive rather than the specialized approach,
the calm rather than the excitable head to which in
war we would choose to entrust the fate of our
brothers and children, and the safety and honor of
our country. "233
D. DOCTRINE: THE PRODUCT
The product of the process that has been developed in
this chapter is the doctrine. It is this which guides the
actual disposition and employment of the resources of the
nation; it is this which is the tangible result of a syn-
thesis between the environment, values, strategy and planning.
Because so much of the process is flexible in nature, more of
a method of thinking than a rigid checklist, the product too
is flexible. Each level of strategy produces its own doc-
trine, each is coordinated with the others, but each is only
as specific as is necessary to convey objectives to the levels
below and as is allowable considering the temporal perspective
which pertains
.
John Collins names five types of plans which "...interlock
and overlap but remain distinct." These five types are con-
cept formulation, requirement plans, capability plans,
mobilization plans, and crisis plans. Concept formulation
deals with "...how to satisfy aims and missions," or in short,
what objectives need be laid out for subordinate levels and




plans can be combined into a category labeled as operational
plans. They deal with what means are necessary, and short of




Over the evolution of American planning, the elements of
logistics and mobilization have been mastered. Yet, in an
age of long lead items and high technology, the question must
once again be raised as to whether or not current mobilization
plans are realistic. Some have gone so far as to suggest a
limited mobilization in peacetime, while others argue that
mobilization is irrelevant since the United States is all
°35
ready engaged in a protracted conflict." Betts has argued,
in support of his "surge" thesis, that certain industries,
such as ammunition and small arms, be capable of relatively
instantaneous conversion to wartime production." " This
appears reasonable, but by itself will not solve the crucial





235 For the former, see Richard B. Foster and Francis P.
Hoeber, "Limited Mobilization: A Strategy for Preparedness
and Deterrence in the Eighties," Orbis , Fall 1980, pp.
439-457. The latter argument forms the main theme of Possony
and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology . On the subject of
mobilization see also Fred Charles Tkle, "Preparing for
Industrial iMobilization: The First Step Toward Full Strength,"
in National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength ,"
ed. W. Scott Thompson (San Francisco: Institute for
Contemporary Studies, 1980), pp. 55-68.
Surprise Attack, p. 297.
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capability in large items such as. tactical aircraft, tanks,
and, perhaps of greatest significance, strategic sealift. 2j7
In general then, the planning process yields two basic
types of doctrine. The first is the long range, conceptual
plan which provides guidance and long term objectives. This
doctrine, while general in nature, forms the stable mooring
upon which the shorter term plans are based. Short term
doctrine is the second type that arises out of the process
just described. It deals with current capabilities and
objectives and with crisis situations. Again, every level
of strategic planning must produce both long range and short
term, but by far the more important are the former." If
the system is developed properly, the short term, crisis
plans can be developed with each period of tension. But,
this can only be done under the guidance of a long range
concept. While each level must do both, the long range
?57
These issues are receiving increasing attention in the
open literature. Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War,"
and Record, The Rapid Deployment Force
,
both suggest ways of
dealing with current shortcomings . See also Thomas E. Etzold,
Defense or Delusion? Americas Military in the 1980s (New York:
Harper and Row, 1982) , especially Ch. VI . For a discussion of
the sensitivity to Soviet naval activities of American res-
ponse to a Central Front war, see Paul H. Nitze, et.al.,
Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western
Alliance Options (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press , 1979)
,
Ch. 15 . The current degree of American reliance on a large
logistical tail, which in turn increases demands on mobiliza-
tion requirements, is one of the more persuasive arguments of
the maneuver warfare advocates. See William Lind, "Defining
Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps."
238Collins, U.S. Defense Planning, p. 32.
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doctrine at the national strategy level is not of the same
scope nor time horizon as is that of the overall level.
The tendency of the United States to concentrate on the
short range crisis plans rather than on the longer range
conceptual plans deprives the nation of its beacon. Instead
it is forced to lurch along, surrounded by the fog of the
present, subject to the vicissitudes of current events.
Samuel Huntington provides an accurate analogy to this
condition
:
"A republic, however, is like a raft: slow, ungainly,
impossible to steer, no place from which to control
events, and yet endurable and safe. It will not sink,
but one's feet are always wet."^"
The raft will not sink due to the ravages of nature, but it
can be destroyed when run over by the sleek clipper of the
totalitarian state. Unless America can somehow gain control
over its direction, it will be unable to prevent this col-
lision, a failure which would, as Alexander Hamilton writes,




Within the environment of international relations, sub-




Federalist Papers 1, p. 33
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strategic planners devise doctrine. The goal of the doctrine
is to further the security interests of the nation in the
most effective and efficient manner.
The evolution of planning in America continues. As the
environment becomes increasingly threatening, the impetus for
reform strengthens. This chapter has laid out a framework
which can aid in the development of goals and objectives in
the reform process. Strategy is a method of thought, so too
must planning be. In any event, the key elements remain
flexibility and timeliness.
The case is put forth, not just here but in many of the
works cited above. Change is essential if America is to meet
its commitments and if it is to know security. The one
remaining question, put forth by General Jones,
"...is whether we will show the wisdom to do as the
British did, or whether we will muddle along as we
have in the past until some crisis or disaster
awakens us to the need for change . "241
"What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," p. 35.
In writing of the British, he is referring to the dispatch
with which they reformed their military organization. On
this subject see Neville Trotter," A British View of the
Incentives for JCS Reform," Armed Forces Journal International
,
May 1982, p. "0. On the need to reform, see also Russell F.
Weigley, "To the Crossing of the Rhine: American Strategic





"The. crucial clement ok hope amid tke cunnent
dnl^t lies In tke K.eco llectlo n o i what tke
kmzn.lc.an 6pln.lt o £ activist optimism kas 60
ofiten accomplished- -token It was rallied by
Its leadens and pkllosopkens to a vision o &
shaded goals . "
kdm. H.G. Rlckoven, USM 242
What is strategy? Why is it so neglected in the United
States? How can strategic planning be improved? These are a
few of the questions that have been addressed in this paper.
Not all have been answered, nor was that to be expected.
Strategy is an exceedingly complex subject; one that requires
a substantial amount of study, contemplation and experience
to comprehend. Indeed, even those answers developed on the
previous pages require further study in order to fully under-
stand their implications and to ensure their validity and
cohesiveness . Nevertheless, a beginning has been made, and
there are some results to show for it. By way of a short
summary allow me to emphasize the main points of the paper,
and to set the stage for the recommendations that will follow.
The paper began with a discussion of what was termed the
fundamental environment of international relations. This
concept was developed from the writings of Carl von Clausewitz,
242
"Thoughts on Man's Purpose in Life... and Other Matters,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Dec. 1974, p. 69.
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and suggested a framework for the analysis of events and the
planning of strategy. In no way was it meant to represent a
"theory" of international relations. That task is amply
addressed by others, as was noted in Chapter II. Instead,
the chapter sought to explicate some of the more obvious
characteristics of interaction in the international arena;
concepts which for all their simplicity are more often
ignored than not. Because of this, it is essential to under-
stand the fundamental point of that chapter: any plan, any
organization, any conce.pt that hope* to deal with foreign
-relation* mu6t account §01 the uncertainty and emotion
Inherent In the International environment. To ignore this,
to reject uncertainty, to plan only according to the more
tangible, "concrete" factors, is to ignore reality.
The major topic of the next chapter was strategy. It is
defined as a method of thought, not a specific plan of action.
The reason for such a definition is to underscore the need for
flexibility and responsiveness. These qualities are essential
in any process which hopes to remain ahead of events in this
age of rapid communications, high speed transport, and inter-
continental missiles. It was argued that, because events
move at such a rapid pace, and because the ally of today may
be the enemy of tomorrow (especially in the Third World) , it
is ill-advised to rely on preconceived plans. Rather, the
process of strategy as a method of thought allows the formula-





Strategy thus became a conceptual framework within which
plans could be developed that would seek to guide events of
today toward the realization of the goals of tomorrow.
Indeed, it is strategy that forms the link between the broad
policy objectives of the nation--as derived from the national
interests and the international environment --and the means
available to realize those objectives. Strategy, as taken
from Clausewitz, could serve only policy, though policy was
at the same time seen to be constrained by the realities
offered by strategy. In this sense, the "communication"
between them is two way, with policy remaining supreme.
Such a communication flow, it was shown, also existed between
the various levels of strategy. Thus, for example, strategy
would drive technology, but at the same time, it would be
forced to respond to the realities technology presents.
The chapter on strategy dealt with the conceptual frame-
work within which planning could take place. In the final
t\vo chapters, the function of planning was considered. The
purpose of the process of planning, as developed in those
chapters, is essentially to institutionalize flexibility and
responsiveness. It was shown that planning must consider the
nature of the environment in which doctrine must operate. It
must also consider the opponent, for the destruction of his
will to oppose ours is the objective of planning. Finally,
planning must consider the impact that the plan which is
developed will have on subsequent events.
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When these requirements are taken into account, the
process by which strategy is to be implemented must also be
flexible. Because of the nature of the international
environment, it is far better to strive to adapt to uncertainty
than it is to attempt to eliminate it. The goal then must be
to devise a system that allows the absorption of the uncer-
tainties of events while maintaining a focus on the distant
goals of the future. Again, to emphasize the importance of
flexibility and to underscore the driving principal of this
work, allow a repeat of the quote found at the beginning of
Chapter 3:
"Strategy cannot be a single defined doctrine; it is a
method o £ tkougkt, the object of which is to codify
events, set them in order of priority and then choose
the most effective course of action. There will be a
strategy to fit each situation; any given strategy
may be the best possible in certain situations and the ,_,-
worst conceivable in others. That is the basic truth.""
A. RECOMMENDATIONS
The primary purpose of this thesis has been to outline a
method of thought; a framework of planning which in turn
would serve to guide its continuing evolution. The framework
is intended to be general and conceptual rather than
prescriptive. As such, it is designed to structure thinking
on organizational reform, rather than to submit a blueprint
9 4 3
Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, p. 13
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for that reform. Nevertheless, certain general recommenda-
tions are warranted as a result of this study.
The points outlined below are limited to the military
field. To address these questions to the whole of strategy
and planning would require several volumes. It is here that
the need for strategy is the clearest and, quite frankly, it
is here that the author's experience lies. The following is
a list of the recommendations offered; a discussion and
justification of each v/ill follow:
a. Increase the philosophical and historical training
of officers, especially strategic planners.
b. Train and assign planners as such. They should
periodically rotate to field and fleet units from
staffs, but their primary job, and longest tours,
should be as planners
.
c. Centralize the chain of command in the Defense
Department by placing the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff directly under the Secretary of
Defense, and by providing him with a staff.
d. Decentralize authority in the Defense Department
to the greatest extent possible.
This section will first establish the criteria for these
recommendations, then will analyze them in detail. Finally,
the proposals will be measured against the criteria to
determine their likely effectiveness.
1 . Criteria of Reform
There are four criteria of reform:
a. The need to improve long range planning.
b. The need to increase initiative, innovation,
and boldness among planners and officers.
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c. The need to improve the organizational self-
criticism.
d. The need to increase public support.
These criteria, which reflect the need for reform,
arise from the traditional American neglect of the art of
war. The progress of strategic thinking in America over its
history has at best been slow. The significant improvements
in planning since the Civil War have not carried with them
improvements in strategic thought. The American military,
even after Vietnam, largely ignores the study of the art
j. 244
of war. In a form of retrenchment from the trauma of that
war, the military has closed ranks against the outside world
and withdrawn in upon itself. Far from seeking to understand
the fundamental questions that the Vietnam War uncovered, the
military has chosen to ignore them, turning once again to the
pursuit of technical and tactical perfection. Lacking an
overall philosophy, each symptom of failure in that war has
been addressed on its own merits. The military busily set
to correcting these symptoms without striving to critically
assess their fundamental causes.
Colonel Harry Summers is one of the first military
authors who has refused to participate in this retrenchment,
244
Lt.Col. Dennis M. Drew, "Military Art and the American
Tradition: The Vietnam Paradox Revisited," Air University
Review
,
Jan. -Feb. 1983, p. 53. On the increasing interest in
the lessons of the Vietnam War, in both the academic world
and the military, see Fox Butterfield, "The New Vietnam
Scholarship," The New York Times Magazine , 13 Feb., 1983.
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and who has sought to place the war in perspective. His work
hopefully marks the beginning of a truly critical analysis
of the war, and the beginning of a strategic frame of mind in
24 5American military officers." On the whole, however, the
military remains tied to a discussion of strategy in terms of
the defense budget, vice addressing the defense budget in
terms of strategy. The level of defense spending is merely
a proxy measure of the ability of the military to do its job,
and an arguably poor one at that. The military however,
continues to insist on its use, a convention all too welcomed
by civilians who know not the art of war and the difficulties
inherent in combat. The military has in short surrendered its
strong suit- -expertise in the art of war. Writing of the
failure of strategy in Vietnam, Summers argues:
?45
On Strategy . Several works by military officers have
recently appeared that urge an increased emphasis on the study
of military art. Most recent are those of Lt. Col. Drew,
"Military Art and the American Traiditon"; and RAdm . Stockdale,
"Educating Leaders". The Naval Institute has presented some
excellent articles on the subject over the past several years.
Among the more noteworthy are RAdm. Winnefeld, "The Quality of
The Officer Corps," pp. 32-38; Cdr. Buell, "The Education of
A Warrior," pp. 40-4 5; and Cdr. Robert C. Powers, USN,
"Escalation Control," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings .
Col. William Staudenmaier , USA, provides an excellent review
of strategy and the art of war in "Strategic Concepts for
the 1980s," Military Review, Mar. and Apr., 1982.
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"Without a foundation in military art we could not
compete with the rationalistic proposals of the
defense analysts, and the effect was a failure in
our responsibilities to present alternative strate-
gies to our civilian leaders. "246
Because the military chooses to argue its case on the
plane of defense budgets rather than strategy, the debate is
focused on inputs such as forces and relative capabilities.
The perspective is technical rather than conceptual. Because
of this perspective, what plans are developed fiz&pond to
techniques and technology rather than guid-ing them.
An excellent example of this case is to be found in
Jeffrey S. McKitrick's article "A Military Look at Military
Reform." In a critique of the maneuver warfare concept sug-
gested by the military reformers, he argues that the American
army cannot think of using such a doctrine because of its
large logistics tail. This tail is caused by requirements
for fuel, in both large quantities and high quality. He
fails to address the substance of maneuver warfare; and he
does not provide the slightest hope that these essentially
technical difficulties can be overcome. Not, it is far
better, from his vantage point, to continue to develop the
very high technology equipment which has given rise to the
24"*
"tail" in the first place, rather than change.
On Strategy
,
p. 44. He also notes here that "this
problem lingers on." See Edward Luttwak, "The Decline of
American Military Leadership," Parameters: Journal of the US
Army War College ', Dec. 1980, pp. 82-88.
^ 4
'"A Military Look at Military Reform," pp. 60-61.
Professor McKitrick is a member of the Department of Social
Sciences, U.S. Military Academy.
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Such an inversion of the roles of ends and means is,
unfortunately, a trait of the American military. It leads
not to innovation and adaptability, which are so sorely
needed, but to an obsession with the status quo. Without a
concept of strategy, the military is forced to act and plan
out of habit, for there is no guidance for the direction
which change must follow." Under such conditions, it
must continue to do things as it has in the past until
presented, usually in the form of a military setback, with
the evidence of necessary change. An excellent example is
the tendency with which the Navy clung to the concept of the
? d. Qbattle line up to 7 December, 1941.
Out of this tendency toward the status quo, several
requirements demand attention. These requirements in turn
become the criteria of reform. The first is the need to
improve strategic planning, both short and long range; to
utilize the long range perspective properly; and to coordinate
the efforts of the various organizations within the Department
of Defense (and without it) . The second requirement is to
foster an environment of initiative, innovation and boldness,
that will encourage flexibility and responsiveness, and will
allow a delegation of authority to lower levels. This is
essential if the threat posed by the international system is
9 a g
Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy
, p . 29
249
Weigley, The American Way of War, p. 2 55
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to be met. The third necessity is to encourage self-
250
criticism. Only in this way may the process be improved
from within in response to developments from without. Self-
criticism fosters a continuous evolution of ideas. If such
creativeness is stifled in preference to conformity, the
implication arises that the existing doctrine cannot stand
the test of new ideas. Indeed, it could go so far as to
251
mean there is in fact no doctrine. The final requirement
is to improve public awareness and support, and this can
only be accomplished by articulating a strategy that is tied
to the national values; values the people can understand and
appreciate
.
2. Training of Officers
Sam Sarkesian has stated
"I am. . .convinced that the problems facing the military
profession are more philosophical and political than
organizational or administrative . "252
His concluding chapter, of which this passage is a part,
emphasizes the argument that tinkering with organization and
force structure, without altering the philosophical foundations
2 50Clausewitz discusses this in the context of "Critical
Analysis." On War , 11:5. See also Summers On Strategy ,
Chapter 8, pp. 83-92.
Lippmann, The Public Philosophy
,
p. 89.
252 Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military
Professionalism (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 266.
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of the officer corps, amounts to "...putting old wine into
2 53
new bottles--nothing really changes." A review of the
literature of strategy reveals one single common thread, one
that is emphasized repeatedly, and just as often forgotten:
the moral factors in war dominate. These are the factors
which reform must address if it is to succeed, and these are
the factors that planners must understand:
"What battles have in common is human: the behavior
of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for
self-preservation, their sense of honour and the
achievement of some aim over which other men are
ready to kill them. The study of battle is there-
fore always a study of fear and usually of courage;
always of leadership, usually of obedience;...
always of uncertainty and doubt, misinformation and
misapprehension, usually also of faith and sometimes
of vision; always of violence, sometimes also of cruelty,
self-sacrifice, compassion. . ."254
This quote is no more than a restatement Clausewitz and
Napoleon, and it has been echoed time and again since their
era.
Reflecting both Keegan's conclusion and the theme of
Sarkesian's critique, David Abshire, in the opening sentence
of "The Leadership Debate" argues that:
"None of the challenges that face the United States in
the 1980' s and beyond is more serious than the decline
of leadership throughout American society . "^5o
" J
^Ibid., p. 268.
254John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: The Viking
Press, 1976), pp. 297-298.
" 5o
"The Leadership Debate," The Washington Quarterly ,
Winter 1985, p. 29.
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It is clear that one of the most pressing needs is to reform
the training of officers, and to change their perspective
from that of adherers to the status quo to leaders of change.
While this adjustment must, in time, affect the whole of the
officer corps, it is of the utmost urgency to begin now with
the strategic planners who will develop the plans by which
the military will march into the future.
In what direction must this change proceed? Basically
there are two essential ingredients to the education of a
strategic planner, both of which are presently lacking. The
first is a firm foundation in philosophy. That this field of
study has long been regarded as superfluous by the action-
minded and technically-oriented military is no reason that
it should continue to be so. The value of this type of back-
ground lies not in the realm of application of the principles
learned, but more in the development of a firm foundation
upon which an officer, planner, or commander, can base his
decisions. While a lack of philosophical foundation may
cause no serious problems in a time of "business-as -usual ,
"
it can precipitate collapse, as Admiral Stockdale argues, in
time of crisis. He goes on to argue that philosophy, by
fostering integrity, can "...give a person something to rely
on when perspective seems to blur, when rules and principles
seem to waver, and when faced with a hard choice of right
j ,,256and wrong.
2:,6Stockdale, "Educating Leaders," pp. 50-51
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Clausewitz, in his chapter on military genius in war,
provides a glimpse of the pressures the combat leader must
withstand, pressures that exist today as well as in his time,
and that pertains equally to land, sea and air warfare:
"It is the impact of the ebbing of moral and physical
strength, of the heart-rending spectacle of the dead
and wounded, that the commander has to withstand-
-
first in himself, and then in all those who, directly
or indirectly, have entrusted him with their thoughts
and feelings, hopes and fears. As each man's strength
gives out, as it no longer responds to his will, the.
lne.fi.tla. 03 the. whole, gradually corner to n.e.&t en the
commanded' £ wa.11 alone.. The ardor of his spirit must
rekindle the flame of purpose in all others; his in-
ward fire must revive their hope. "257 (Emphasis
added)
Where in the training of an engineer, manager, or
analyst, is there found the necessary background to support
such an awesome responsibility? It is not. Only with a firm
foundation in philosophy and in the ideals of his nation can
an officer hope to meet the challenge set for him. The
strategic planner, though he may not be the commander, must
understand these pressures if he is to provide the commander
with appropriate options; therefore he too must have a firm
founding in philosophy.
The main impediment to such education is the rapid
pace of officer assignment patterns today. One proceeds from
On War , 1:5:104. Also, for a classic analysis of the
individual in battle, especially junior officers, see John





school to field (or sea), the schools preparing for the field.
Nowhere does one gain the respite necessary for the deep con-
templation required to assimilate the principles of philosophy
Indeed, as John Collins suggests, those schools which provide
a basic foundation (in mid-career) , adhere to the "Scattergun"
approach:
"Military strategy courses in the National War College
core curriculum during the period 1960-1981 averaged
20 topics in 17 duty days. Some of the topics were
worth a semester or more. That approach allows mini-
mum opportunity to study the strengths and weaknesses
of present concepts, much less compare them with
options . "258
Or as Bernard Brodie argues:
"...it has to be added that in the training of the
modern officer such study and rumination are not
allowed for either at the staff college level or
the war college. "259
Philosophy requires contemplation and study, it cannot
be batch fed. Likewise, the second basic area of study also
requires time. History, according to Stockdale, "...gives
perspective to the problems of the present and drives home
the point that there is really very little new under the
sun." In the field of military art, such a study of
history, especially military history, provides the only sub-
stitute for combat experience; experience which is becoming
increasingly costly and rare today. For confirmation of the





"Educating Leaders," p. 50.
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value of the study of history to an army, one need only refer
to the superb performance of the relatively inexperienced
Prussian army against the Austrians at the battle of Sadowa
in 1866. 261
Without a study of history, the commander and the
planner are forced to rely on their own narrow experience in
the formulation of plans. In that one's own experience sel-
dom exceeds thirty years and is subject to select recall, it
is history that must form the core of the planner's tools.
Through it he may see how plans have worked and how they have
failed in the past; he can come to understand the true nature
of friction in war, and the overriding concern he must have
for simplicity. Perhaps of greatest import, the study of
history will lend to the planner a sense of confidence in his
decisions, which will enable him to withstand counter opinions
as well as the vicissitudes of battle.
"If we are to regain some of the uncertainties of our
life, we must understand and incorporate the most
universal and worthy ideas of the past into our
present existence . "'^62
Without such training, the planner is likely to base his
conclusions on some criterion other than friction or the
7 f\ ~\
"The superiority of the Prussian army in the [eighteen-]
sixties was made possible only by its organization, by its
peacetime training, and by the theoretical study of war."
Hajo Holborn, "Moltke and Schlieffen: The Prussian-German
School," in Makers of Modern Strategy , ec . E.M. Earle, p. 172.
"'Rickover, "Thoughts on Man's Purpose in Life," p. 72.
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nature of war. This criterion can take the form of economic
efficiency or probabilities of success. These, however, do
not conform to the nature of conflict, and therefore will be
unlikely to succeed, except in the most favorable of
circumstances. -
Thus, the education of commanders and planners alike
must be based on philosophy and history, not just in passing,
but in great depth. For only in this way can the officer
learn the art of war, and only by learning the art of war can
he hope to prevail in the fluid and fast paced environment of
today. Such training provides the officer with the tools
necessary to think, not just to know; and these are the tools
essential to the concept of strategy as a method of thought.
As Rodger argues in his indictment of the Royal Navy of the
19th Century:
"The gap in their experience made it all the more
important that they- should have been trained to
think clearly .... [However ] , no education was given
which tended to broaden the mind or develop the
powers of informed j udgment . . . . If naval officers
had been trained not only to know, but to think,
they might have realized that the circumstances in
which they had grown up, far from being inevitable
and immutable, were the accidental consequences of
circumstances which were, by the 1830s, already pas-
sing away.... As it was, they were knowledgeable and
enthusiastic proponents of technical change and
material development, who had lost sight of the
objects for which the Navy existed; highly txalmd,
and wholly u.n2.dacate.d."^° 4 (Emphasis added)
7 f\ "
°Possony and Pournelle, Strategy of Technology , p. 88.
" 64 N.A.M. Rodger, "British Naval Thought and Naval Policy,
1820-1890: Strategic Thought in an Era of Technological
Change," in New Aspects of Naval History , ed. Craig L. Symonds
(Annapolis, Md . : Naval Institute Press, 1981), pp. 148-149.
152

The British obsession with technology stemmed from the
combination of a century of naval warfare that pitted the
mighty Royal Navy against the tribes of Africa and the pirates
of the South China Sea, and the rapid pace of technological
change in that period. From the fall of Napoleon to the First
World War, no serious naval threat was faced.
The U.S. Navy is in much the same situation today, not
having fought a major naval force in battle since 1945. The
uses of the fleet since World War II have been markedly
similar to those of the Royal Navy in the 19th Century. The
emphasis on technology and training is also similar. Without
a strategy to give perspective to this recent trend, the
military thus risks falling into the same trap that the
British did. To guard against this, to maintain a "fighting
edge," requires a study of the art of war based on philosophy
and history. In the words of Marshal Maurice de Saxe
:
"...very few men occupy themselves with the higher
problems of war. They pass their lives drilling
troops and believe that this is the only branch of
the military act. When they arrive at the command
of armies they are totally ignorant, and, in default ?65
of knoxving what should be done, they do what they know.""
5. Assignment Policies
Training however, is only half the problem with
personnel. The other half lies with assignment policies
"My Reveries Upon the Art of War," (1757), in Roots of
Strategy ,' ed . Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, USA (Harrisburg,
Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1940), pp. 296-297.
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Officers are rotated too fast in the interest of developing
well rounded products." With such transcience, the only
stability is to be found in organizations. Therefore, of-
ficers receive a well-rounded, but superficial education,
which fits the concept of managers whose purpose is to fill
a slot and maintain the organization for the short duration
of their tenure. Under these conditions, initiative,
innovation, and development become stifled. Instead, con-
formist and not-rocking-the-boat attitudes prevail.
In order to pursue a concept of strategy as a method
of thought, the qualities necessary for flexibility and rapid
response must be fostered. These qualities include:
"...imagination, boldness, inventiveness, ability to
see the options inherent in a battlefield situation,
willingness to take high risks, and eagerness to
accept responsibility."-^
Such qualities are not inherited, and it is too risky to rely
on fate in the hope that, as in the past,- officers who have
them will "bubble up" to the top. Instead, we must instill
them now, not just in training, but also in experience.
According to General Donn Starry, USA, one of the major
266Winnefeld, "The Quality of the Officer Corps," p. 58.
267Abraham Zaleznik, "The Leadership Gap," The Washington
Quarterly
,
Winter 1983, p. 36.
268William Lind, "Why the German Example," Marine Corps
Gazette
,
June 1982, p, 61.
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reasons for German tactical proficiency and adaptability in
World War II was their "...enormously demanding and rigorous
officer selection and training system.""'
What sort of career path is necessary to cultivate
such qualities? In answer, the need, at least in the realm
of strategic planning, is for a dedicated group of planners.
This is not to suggest that we adopt the system of the German
General Staff, for it had its defects, most notably in the
area of its ability to adapt to a changing social environmentuO -* **£>
270
and its affect on warfare. Instead, officers are needed
who have been trained in the art of war, in history and in
philosophy. These individuals will then proceed to gain
experience in the field as every junior does now. The differ-
ence is that they will serve in much more widely differing
positions. The longer tours would be as planners, while
"field" tours would be shorter. This would keep planners in
touch with the fleet, while at the same time emphasizing their
planning experience.
The primary duty of such officers would be strategic
planning, both long range and operational. By thus providing
them with experience in all fields of military operations, and
by indoctrinating them into the complexities of military art,
7 f\ Q
"To Change an Army," Military Review , March 1985, p. 22
270 See Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: The German Concept of
Total War," in Makers of Modern Strategy , ed. E.M. Earle,
p . 313 .
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these officers will be capable of responding to the ever-
changing international environment rapidly, and subsequently,
will reduce the need for contingency plans and bulky staffs.
By a continuous rotation from field to staff, they will keep
in touch with the realities of operations and will be afforded
the opportunity to witness at first hand the consequences of
their plans. By serving longer tours, perhaps three to four
years each as planners, they will be in a position to follow
up their plans, to ensure their proper implementation, and to
see the mistakes they contain. By thus institutionalizing
strategic planning, proper attention will be given to long
range plans and the development of goals and objectives. In
addition, if the products and opinions of systems analysts,
engineers, operators and scientists are incorporated into the
planning staffs, there will be greater assurance that decisions
are made with the full advice of these various fields. Strate-
gic planners, however, must be the final arbiters, for their
opinions are based on the environment of international rela-
tions, and will thus correspond to the laws of nature as a
whole, rather than of the narrower perspectives of economics
or science. Finally, by making these officers dedicated plan-
ners, a corporate knowledge is developed that at last permits
an accumulation of corporate knowledge, fosters an ability





John Collins best captures the nature of such career
paths in his description of the Prussian General Staff:
"The stated intent was to institutionalize strategic
excellence. Supervisors hand-picked officers, steeped
them in professional skills, kept the most competent,
and orchestrated their efforts. The resultant apparatus
reduced needs to depend on one man for success in
bartering or battle, no matter how brilliant he might
be. ,,2/1
That the system failed in war was due more to the lack of
dissent and political mistakes. Furthermore, because the
system was used by the Germans for aggression in several
wars does not diminish the value of it in producing strategists
and planners of high quality. As was illustrated in the
historical review of planning in Chapter IV, America has in
general been faced with increasingly serious and complex
threats over its history. The gradual development of a
professional military officer corps from the "man of affairs"
concept in the early 19th Century through the reforms of the
early 2Qth, to the National Security Act of 1947 represents
a continuing evolution of American defense doctrine. As the
nation's role in world affairs has increased, so too has the
complexity and sophistication of the defense establishment.
The creation of the Secretary of Defense in 1947, as weak a
position as it was, could not have been accomplished a
century earlier.
271U.S. Defense Planning, pp. 54-55.
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As the evolution of war has blurred the distinction
between land and naval forces, the defense establishment has
developed toward greater cross - service cooperation. That
trend must continue. With a decreasing relative power,
America's margin for error also shrinks, requiring greater
efficiency and coordination of effort. Hence, while a ded-
icated group of planners may not have been necessary (and
certainly not feasible) in 1947, such a need exists today.
History is a chronicle of evolution. The concepts
articulated in this paper must be understood and applied if
this is to be mastered. The point in America's evolution
has been reached when this is both necessary and possible.
In the military field, such a transition is possible without
endangering American democracy, and without endangering
civilian control. In fact, officers trained heavily in
philosophy and history, and thus commanding a clear under-
standing of American culture and the military need to sub-
ordinate strategy to policy, are likely to understand the
importance of civilian control better than those trained
primarily in technical subjects. As Huntington argues, true
civilian control of the military requires a truly professional
rr- 272
officer corps.
272" Soldier and State
,
p. 85. On civil -mil itary relations,
see also Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New
York: The Free Press, 1960] . For an excellent review of the
theory of civil -military relations and some new concepts as





The intention here is not to delve into the organiza-
tion which the above recommendations suggest, however, some
discussion is necessary. In order to foster the environment
conducive to the formulation of effective and efficient plans,
it is essential to develop a greater centralization in the
chain of command, but at the same time, to delegate authority
to a greater extent than is done currently. There is also a
need to further centralize the planning function, not just in
the military, but in the government as a whole.
In the military field, it is essential to place a
senior officer, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, directly in the chain of command, subordinate to the
Secretary of Defense. ' In such a position, he would be
able to coordinate the efforts of the various unified commands
to achieve the aims of policy and national strategy. This
would shift the balance between maintenance and operations in
the direction of operations, a necessary recognized by several
writers including General David C. Jones and Archie D.
274Barrett. To quote from General Jones:
IT?
Recently (April 1983) such a recommendation was con-
tained in the reorganization plan submitted to Congress by the
Secretary of Defense. See Deborah M. Kyle, "DoD's JCS
Reorganization Plan," Armed Forces Journal International
,
May 1983, p. 14.
^ 74Jones, "What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment,"
p. 81; and Archie D. Barrett, "Department of Defense
Organization: Planning for Planning," p. 113.
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"So long as the leadership of the operational side
remains within the control of the four services,
individual service interests - -which are oriented
to independent capabilities - -will continue to
dominate the military advice offered to the
Secretary of Defense." 275
Centralization of the chain of command would thus allow for
truly combined arms warfare.
The Joint Staff, transfigured by the changes in train-
ing and assignment recommended above, would provide the Chair-
man with the necessary planning support, and at the same time,
because of an operational vice maintenance perspective, would
tend more toward the long range planning necessary for success-
ful operations. It must be emphasized that until changes are
first made in the nature of the officers assigned to the Joint
Staff, a change in the organization will have little effect.
The planners will have little previous knowledge of planning,
will be there too short a period of time, and will be too
dependent on their parent services to provide for the sound
joint planning that is essential if the United States is to
meet its obligations.
Coincident with restructuring of the chain of command,
the planning function must be centralized. This means that
the individual service staffs and the field staffs must in
7 7 f\
some way be brought under the direction of the Joint Staff.
275
"What*s Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," p. 31.
? 7 f\
Col. Hanne, proposes two separate staffs, an Armed
Forces staff charged with short-term operational planning and
directlv subordinate to the President, and a Defense Staff,
160

The consequences of this shift will be truly subordinate the
services to the national interest, or at least to the interests
of the Defense Department as a whole. Such an organization is
necessary if the link between national strategy, operational
strategy and tactics is to be formed. For example, without
this subordination, the services are free to pursue their own
procurement functions irrespective of the dictates of
strategy. Such autonomy gives rise to inflated budget requests,
not because the services intentionally inflate their estimates,
but because, lacking firm guidance from above, they must
assume that they must be prepared to do everything within




Four requirements were listed above as criteria for
reform. A review of them will draw together the preceding
recommendations and will demonstrate that if implemented, the
changes will satisfy the criteria. The first requirement was
headed by the Secretary of Defense and tasked with long range
procurement planning. The current service staffs would come
under the Defense Staff. Although it runs the risk of exces-
sively separating procurement and operation, this concept
represents a marked improvement over the current system.
"An Armed Forces Staff," pp. 59-63.
277Other reasons also exist, one of the more realistic
ones being the tendency to ask for more than you feel you
need, knowing full well it will be cut. This practice, from
personal experience, begins at the very lowest levels. A





to improve long and short range planning. By developing a
dedicated group of properly trained planners, by centralizing,
to an extent, the planning process, and by making slight
adjustments in the organization, the quality of planning as
well as its flexibility, perspective, timeliness and effi-
ciency also improve; and thus, the first requirement is met.
The second requirement was to foster initiative, which
grows out of an organization that places a higher emphasis on
the individual leader than on the organization. Initiative
requires longer tenures in each job to allow the member to
gain knowledge of it and to come to identify with it, seeking
not just to support the organizational requirements, but also
to improve the system. It is the special nature of the leader
that, if allowed to flourish, will go far in "...eliciting a
response from followers in order to extend their energies and
?73
attitudes toward larger goals and values."" It is hoped
that through more rigorous training, specialization and longer
tours, an environment conducive to the growth of these
qualities will develop.
The third requirement was to instill an improved
capacity for self-criticism. Such a capacity cannot rely on
the current system to develop. Officers who are rewarded
more for "zero defects" than for putting themselves on report,
cannot be expected, honesty aside, to follow the latter




course. Again, the improved training recommended above
and the encouragement of initiative should go far to meet this
requirement. Officers who have the moral and philosophical
background on which to base their actions, who have the his-
torical perspective to realize the danger of reporting falsely
or in a distorted manner, and who are rewarded for improve-
ments, not zero defects will develop the capability to
self -criticize
.
An additional benefit to increased frankness in
introspection, is that the requirements for reporting are
likely to diminish, mainly because officers will have a much
higher degree of trust for their subordinates. The supreme
example, and the goal to strive for, is the German self-
criticism after the Poland invasion of 1939. The following,
rather lengthy quote from an article by Williamson Murray
portrays this capacity:
"In every sense this campaign was an outstanding opera-
tional success ... .Yet the OKH [German army high command]
judged the operational success as insufficient and
inadequate. In fact, the after-action reports... of the
German army for the whole period of 1938-1940 reflected
a very different tone than the author's experience in
the U.S. Air Force in the 1960s. In the latter case,
reports on combat capabilities and performance con-
sistently became more and more optimistic, the higher
the headquarters. The opposite was the case with the
German after-action reports: The higher the headquarters,
the more demanding and dissatisfied were commanders with
operational performance. iMoreover, the entire German
system during this period seems to have involved a
279
Taylor, "Leading the Army," p. 43.
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greater degree of trust and honesty between the levels
of command. German officers in command positions were
not afraid to express their belief that their units
were deficient when circumstances justified such
comments ... .Thii> willZngneA* to be & el &- critical wat
one oh the major factor* that enabled the German army
to pen.hox.rn at 6uch a high level throughout Would War
IT.... There appears to have been little fear on the
part of German commanders that critical comments and
evaluations of their units' performance would be un-
welcomed by superiors." 280 (Emphasis added)
Self-criticism is the key to the continual evolution
and growth of an organization. If the members of that or-
ganization fear that their honest criticism will be detri-
mental to their own careers, then either by intentional
falsification, or more probably by omission, their reports
will not be true. Once this state of affairs develops within
an organization, information flow is effectively shut off.
Without this, upper level commanders and the planners they
employ loose touch with the forces they purport to control.
The danger of this, severe though it is during peacetime,
becomes crucial, and potentially decisive in war. The meas-
ures suggested above can be of use in alleviating such a
situation
.
The final requirement was to improve public support
for defense. While military officers and most well informed
civilians recognize the need for defenses, much of the public
does not. The analogy of not being able to see over the
ramparts which surround them, aptly describes the situation.
"The German Response to Victory in Poland," Armed
Forces and Society , Winter 1981, pp. 286-287, 289.
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In order to improve the support of this public, the military
and the government as a whole must first demonstrate to them
that the forces that the country has are the most efficient
and effective their money can buy. While this may never be
completely possible, the continuous bombardment of the people
with media coverage of cost overruns and leaks ensures that
it probably never will. If, however, the recommendations
suggested in this paper are implemented, not only will the
military be able to utilize resources more efficiently (the
equivalent of "leaner and meaner" forces) , but it will be
able to "sell" itself much more convincingly. The main
reason for this will be the all too clear link between the
national values, which the people hold dear, and the means at
hand. In short, the people will begin to get the impression
that the military, and hopefully the government as a whole,
knows its business.
B. SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The reforms proposed above address the military field.
They are not specific, being instead conceptual in nature.
They are also not exhaustive. Other reforms are necessary,
reforms in other parts of the government and, though beyond
the capability of the law, reforms in the way Americans view
their role in the world and in history. The ideas developed
in this work form the conceptual framework for these reforms,
without prescribing their content. Even so, some questions
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have surfaced as a result of this effort; questions which
remain to be studied and to which there may in fact be no
answers
.
First, what will the nature of the system that develops
out of this framework, and how will it be implemented? A
key point here is that this paper has developed the point of
view from which the proper system is to be designed. It has
not attempted to design that system. Much less has the thesis
addressed reform of the government writ large. Civilian,
indeed, popular control of the reins of power remains one of
the key issues, specifically in military reform, but also in
2 81that of the government . "'
The issue of implementation begs some additional questions
What will be the nature and duration of a transition period?
What will be the impetus for reform; internal military initia-
tives, Congressional drives, or external trauma, such as a
military defeat? Will military officers trained in manage-
ment and engineering even be able to understand the need for
change and the direction it must take? And, finally, how, if
at all, will a consensus about the nature of change be
formulated?
The next question delves further into the idea of American
values. How will this system, especially if implemented
1 O "I
"General Vessey, in a recent interview, stated that one
criterion for deciding on any reorganization would be the
maintenance of civilian control. "An Exclusive AFJ Interview




throughout the government as a whole, impact traditional
American ideals? If it will result in, or require, a signif-
icant alteration in them, should it be rejected; or is our
situation in the world serious enough to warrant some changes?
Is the following statement by Godfrey Hodgson valid, or
dangerous?
:
"To adjust to a future of limited, though magnificent,
resources will demand a historic shift in American
values . "^°2
In fact one could even go so far as to ask, as Walter Lippmann
did in the mid-1950s, whether or not our people are being
indoctrinated into those values; and whether or not, because
of this, they have the wherewithall to resist the charm of
28 5
any demagogue that may care to excite their passion?
Turning to more specific questions, how will the budgetary
process need to be changed if at all? It can be argued that
with the increased proficiency of military planners, a mutual
trust and respect would gradually develop between the Defense
Department and Congress. Again, however, the nature of the
transition phase is beyond this study. In fact, one must ask,
how can the budgetary process remain as it is when the opera-
tional level of strategy is to be responsible for the
development of hardware, and should have the freedom of action
28 2 Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time (New York;
Doubleday, 1976), p. 498.
285 Public Philosophy
,
The Military- Industrial Complex, p. 1
"Publi , p. 75. See also Paul A.C. Koistinen,
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necessary for rapid response and adaptability in the selec-
tion of equipment?"
The final major question which this study has prompted
is the old issue of security versus liberty. For the major
part of American history, the issue was ignored, security
2 S 5being taken for granted. Indeed, it was the British who
protected American trade and who planned its strategy; the
United States was merely the tool. The two world wars of
this century destroyed the power of this protector and thrust
America into the role of world leader, a role for which it was
ill prepared. The initial wave of confidence borne of victory
in World War II, was shown to be "...in vital respects a
fool's paradise" by the events of the 1960s. Those events,
for all their value in pointing out to America that it could
not simply buy peace and prosperity or enforce it with mili-
tary power, failed to generate an answer to the question of
7 88the balance between security and the Bill of Rights." Will
284 Possony and Pournelle argue that, in the technological
war, maneuver is accomplished with industries and technology.
Strategy of Technology
, pp. 4-8. As a result, some form of
increased treedom of action is required if operational strat-
egy is to have the requisite flexibility to deal with Soviet
technological advances.
?8 5Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti -Federalists Were For
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 37.
286 See Colin Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 28.




Henry Steele Commager, The Defeat of America, p. 161.
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the system proposed here, by providing strong links between
national values and strategy and the international environment
answer this question? Will the answer allow America to remain
America? If not, what options remain?
These then are some of the questions which this study has
fostered. They deal not so much with the substance of the
paper, as with its implications. The goal of any system of
defense must be to provide for the long term survival of the
nation; long enough term so as to allow the nation to play a
part in the formulation of the world state. Thus, like the
Romans
:
"The elusive goal of strategic statecraft [is] to
provide security for the civilization without prejud-
icing the vitality of its economic base and without
compromising the stability of an evolving political
order." 289
America will never be able to do this until its policy and
strategy is firmly subordinated and attuned to the national
values; and this cannot be done without further study of the
substance and implications of this thesis.
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The study of doctrine throughout history yields a composite
of its various forms. Knowing these forms allows the develop-
ment of a general concept of strategic doctrine. This is
p. 1
289 Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire,
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strategy; a philosophy of doctrine. It is this that Clausewitz
accomplished in On Wax, an accomplishment that he alone has
achieved. This is also what is meant by Beaufre when he argues
that strategy must be a method of thought, not a single defined
doctrine. Such a concept allows the strategist to see national
security critically and as a whole, and to therefore develop
plans that fit the circumstances rather than fitting cir-
cumstances to the plan. It is this which allows a nation to
face defeat "...without succumbing to emotional paralysis and
withdrawal, and without lashing out at scapegoats or inventing
291
escapist solutions.""
In closing the paper, three broad conclusions are offered.
First, as a nation, and as a military, America must change the
way it does business. Re^o^m L& <i6£<int<ia.Z . The situation has
evolved to the point where the United States can no longer
have inexperienced and untrained personnel in the positions
that will determine capabilities for years to come. The na-
ture of the American must be changed, for he tends to ignore
the past as irrelevant and the future as too uncertain, there-
29 2by living only for the present. ~ The choice is there,
either America changes from within, or someone, either foreign
or domestic, will produce the traumatic event that will do it
for us. The former course is preferable.
291 Stockdale, "Educating Leaders," p. 52.
292Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bomb, Dread, and Eternity,"
International Security, Fall 1980, p. 4.
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In order to reform, the course which such a reform if to
follow must be laid. This leads to the second conclusicr.
:
StiJ.zc.zy L& ziiZtizlzl
. Lacking it forces a nation to do
things as it has in the past out of habit, and condemns it
to reacting to events as they occur. If the United States is
to be able in any way to shape the nature of the future in a
manner conducive to its own purposes, if Americans are to be
able to understand that which is happening around them and
put it into perspective, and if the country is to be able in
the near and distant future to respond to the fluid nature of
the international environment, then it must deveioo strategy.




"It is this that I have tried to demonstrate, for
convinced that in strategy, as in all human affairs,
it is ideas which rust be the dominant and the guiding 7Q ,
force. But that brings us into the realm of philosophy?"
And indeed it is t: philosophy that the final conclusicr.
is addressed. The American nation, and the military in partic
ular, have never had much need of a philosophy. Why should it
••hen the horizon promised nothing but prosperity and growth,
v.; n: clcuds :f war cluttered the sky? Tires have changed.
however. The United States is now supposedly the "'leader" of
the Free World. But, hew tan a nation be sc presumptuous as
to assume such a role without some overall guiding philosophy?
Worse yet, how can the nation be so audacious to believe that
Intro duetion tc Stratecy • r. _3S.
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the world would welcome its dominance? And how could it
become convinced that the world would be so congenial to
America's desire to purchase the future it only dimly
perceived? America must somehow develop or adopt an overriding
philosophy, one which can bond its people to an ideal, one
which can give the nation perspective, and one which can serve
as a torch, guiding the nation into the future. Philosophy iM
zs^ZYitlal if America is to sustain the will to survive, and
if it is to know the direction the nation must follow.
"But strategy is no more than a means to an end. It is
for policy to lay down the aims to be achieved by
strategy, and policy is governed basically by the
philosophy which we wish to see prevail. The destiny
of the human race depends upon the philosophy which
it chooses and upon the strategy by which it tries
to ensure that that philosophy shall prevail. "294
America is a successful land. When challenged, it rises
to the occasion. It is this, as Adm . Rickover suggested,
which should engender hope that the challenge that lies before
the nation will be met. The challenge is there; America may
have finally come to see it; now is the time to meet it. The
idea of strategy as a method of thought, a philosophy of
doctrine is designed to provide the framework to accomplish
this. In short, reform has no direction without strategy,
and strategy has no purpose without philosophy.
1Q 1
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